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The Feminist Pervasion:
How Gender-Based Scholarship Informs Law and Law Teaching

An edited panel discussion conducted on Thursday, July 24, 2003, at the annual conference
and meeting of the Southeastern Association of Law Schools (SEALS)

Moderator:

Joan MacLeod Heminway1

Panelists:

Ann Bartow2
F. Carolyn Graglia3
Deseriee Kennedy4

PROFESSOR HEMINWAY: Good morning. I am delighted to welcome you to our
moderated panel discussion. The objective of this session is to examine how research and
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Visiting Professor, Boston College Law School (Fall 2005); Associate Professor of Law, The University of
Tennessee College of Law; J.D. New York University School of Law, 1985; A.B. Brown University, 1982.
Professor Heminway is an ex-officio member and former Chair of the Pembroke Center Associates Council, an
alumnae organization that supports Brown University’s Pembroke Center for Teaching and Research on
Women. Her course offerings include Business Associations, Corporate Finance, Representing Enterprises (a
transaction simulation course), Securities Regulation, and Animals & the Law. Professor Heminway desires to
thank Susan Taylor for her very able transcription services and Jen Comiskey for her excellent editorial and
research assistance.
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Law, 1997; J.D. University of Pennsylvania School of Law, 1990; B.S. Cornell University, 1985. In addition to
her appointment at the law school, Professor Bartow is an Affiliated Faculty Member of the Women's Studies
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Homemakers Under Chapter 2 of the ALI Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 2001 BYU L. REV. 993,
993 (2001). She lectures on feminism and its relationship to law. Her book, DOMESTIC TRANQUILITY: A BRIEF
AGAINST FEMINISM (1998) [hereinafter GRAGLIA, DOMESTIC TRANQUILITY], is a critique of the view that the
sexual revolution and its feminist underpinning have positively impacted society and a rebuttal of the attack by
contemporary feminists on the worth of women who devote themselves to homemaking and childrearing.
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writing on feminism5 and gender, as defined by our panelists, shape the law and its teaching.
The idea for this panel discussion originated in an undergraduate women's studies course that
I took at Brown University with the eminent historian Joan Wallach Scott.6

That course,

offered through the Pembroke Center for Teaching and Research on Women at Brown,
introduced me to feminist thought and gendered scholarly perspectives and opened for me an
exciting new world of inquiry.7 Thereafter, academic work became a far more interesting,
meaningful, and enlightening endeavor. That experience occurred over twenty years ago, so

5
Finding an adequate definition of “feminism” is a difficult task because of the sweeping variations in feminist
thought. The diversity of circumstance, perspective, and experience among women has resulted in a diverse
range of feminist approaches to societal power dynamics. According to author Caroline Ramazanoglu,
[w]omen’s emancipation, or liberation, has developed numerous meanings over the
years, not least because the ideas and political aims of those who have struggled for
women have varied. Nineteenth-century European and American movements were
split between socialist and liberal movements favouring either working-class or
middle-class women. Some struggles were confined to white women, while others
fought for rights for blacks or for the working class as well as for women. Organized
women’s movements had developed by the early twentieth century in most parts of the
world. In addition, there have been many spontaneous women’s struggles which are
now forgotten, or are unknown outside local areas.
CAROLINE RAMAZANOGLU, FEMINISM AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF OPPRESSION 6 (1989). She continues:
[a] unified version of feminism cannot reconcile the conflicting struggles within
feminism. Rather than attempting to impose uniformity on diversity, some feminists
have simply accepted feminism as a loose term for a variety of conceptions of the
relations between men and women in society, their origins and how they might be
changed for the better.
Id. at 7 (discussing WHAT IS FEMINISM? (Juliet Mitchell & Ann Oakley eds., 1986)).
6
Professor Joan Wallach Scott teaches at the School of Social Science of the Institute for Advanced Study in
Princeton, New Jersey. She has written extensively on historical topics, including the intersection of history,
feminism, and politics. See, e.g., JOAN W. SCOTT, GENDER AND THE POLITICS OF HISTORY (rev. ed. 1999); JOAN
WALLACH SCOTT, ONLY PARADOXES TO OFFER: FRENCH FEMINISTS AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN (1996); JOAN W.
SCOTT, WOMEN, WORK AND FAMILY (1978); JOAN WALLACH SCOTT, THE GLASSWORKERS OF CARMAUX
(1974). Professor Scott was the founding director of the Pembroke Center for Teaching and Research on
Women at Brown University.
7
Professor bell hooks discusses the importance of gender studies in a university setting.
The institutionalization of women’s studies helped spread the word about feminism. It
offered a legitimate site for conversion by providing a sustained body of open minds.
Students who attended women’s studies classes were there to learn. They wanted to
know more about feminist thinking. And it was in those classes that many of us
awakened politically.
BELL HOOKS, FEMINISM IS FOR EVERYBODY: PASSIONATE POLITICS 21 (2000).
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my relationship with this topic has been a long one.

I hope that this panel will stimulate

some of you to see law or law teaching in a different light.8
Each of our three panelists has a unique and compelling perspective on how feminism
and gender impact law and law teaching. These perspectives have been shaped by research
or teaching on feminism or gender issues and their relationship to law. All our panelists have
law degrees and were, at one time, practicing attorneys. Two of our panelists are law faculty,
and the third is married to a law professor. Collectively, our panelists have written numerous
law review articles; one has written a full length book, portions of which examine the
influence of feminist perspectives on the law. This group is highly qualified and involved
with the subject matter. Their work in this area focuses on what one of our panelists,
Deseriee Kennedy, earlier described to me as:
a desire to improve the lives of those I love and know, and those I love but
have only seen or read about: mothers who struggle to raise their children
alone, women & children who have suffered abuse, individuals who seek to
create their own definition of family, and others whose voices are underrepresented in drafting, enforcing, and interpreting law.9
Each panelist will now briefly describe her relevant research, writing, and, if
applicable, teaching experiences. These introductory remarks are intended to provide an
overview of the panelists' perspectives on the role of feminism or gender-based research and
writing in legal analysis and law teaching. Following these opening remarks, I will ask panel
8

Professor Catharine MacKinnon examines the relationship between feminism and law, noting that
[f]eminism entails a multifaceted approach to society and law as a whole, a methodology
of engagement with a diverse reality that includes empirical and analytic dimensions,
explanatory as well as descriptive aspirations, practical as well as theoretical ambitions. It
lays the whole world open in new ways, offering fresh vistas and angles of vision.
Pursuing its leads is a complex adventure–vast, deep, rich, and open–of reexamining
existing legal and social reality in light of women’s exclusion from, and subordination
within, nothing less than life, law, and scholarship.
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Mainstreaming Feminism in Legal Education, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC., 199, 200 (2003).
9
E-mail from Deseriee Kennedy, Associate Professor, University of Tennessee College of Law, to Joan
Heminway, Associate Professor, University of Tennessee College of Law (July 3, 2003, 17:50:53 EST) (on file
with moderator).
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members a series of questions that relate to their work in this area. Audience comments and
questions are welcome during this part of the program. Following this dialogue, to the extent
that time permits, we will take additional questions from the floor.10

MRS. GRAGLIA: I am not an academic, and I do not teach. I graduated from law school
in 1954, worked in Washington, D.C. in the Department of Justice and as a clerk on the U.S.
Court of Appeals for Warren Burger, and practiced law with Covington & Burling.
However, for the past 43 years, I have been a homemaker. So why am I here? For the same
reasons given by my co-panelist, Deseriee Kennedy, in the words that Joan just read. She
wants to improve the lives of those “whose voices are underrepresented in drafting,
enforcing, and interpreting law.”11 I am also here to speak for an underrepresented group,
homemakers, whose cause I believe has been gravely harmed by the contemporary feminist
movement.12
From the time in 1964 when I first read Betty Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique,13 I
was determined to answer her. I had left the practice of law in 1959 to devote myself to
what, at that time, was the socially acceptable and respected vocation of homemaking and

10

Professor Heminway then introduced the court reporter transcribing the discussion, Susan Taylor, indicated
that the proceedings later may be published, and requested that individuals with questions state their name and
affiliation.
11
See KENNEDY, supra note 9.
12
The “contemporary feminist movement” referenced by Mrs. Graglia is a branch of second-wave feminism
that gained popularity in the 1960s from the first wave of feminism in America. The “first feminist revolt” was
led by women like Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Lucy Stone, and Susan B. Anthony; their goals included (among
others) abolition, suffrage, and improved working conditions. CAROL HYMOWITZ & MICHAELE WEISSMAN, A
HISTORY OF WOMEN IN AMERICA 88-121 (1978). Second-wave feminists “share a commitment to individual
autonomy and choice and insist that these freedoms be afforded to women as well as men” and often work for
equality through the legal system. MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 16-17
(2d ed., 2003).
13
BETTY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE (1963).
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childrearing.14 In the 1960s, the feminist movement began its vicious attack on homemakers,
seeking to disadvantage them both socially and economically. Their goal was to drive
women into the career-oriented workplace alongside men, thereby enabling women to gain
economic and social independence.15 Our opinion-making cultural elite16 propagated the
feminist message that homemakers are parasites,17 inferior, dependent children who lack any
real function, and live without using adult capabilities or intelligence.18 Homemakers were
described as being less than fully human; our lives were described as a waste of the human

14

See Joan Williams, From Difference to Dominance to Domesticity: Care as Work, Gender as Tradition, 76
CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1441, 1447-48 (2001). Over the past few years, some of the women who have been
pursuing careers have begun to return home to a life they find more fulfilling. See Lisa Belkin, The Opt-Out
Revolution, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 26, 2003; Claudia Wallis, The Case for Staying Home, TIME, March 22,
2004, at 51. According to a recent U.S. Census report, in 2002, nearly 10.6 million children were being raised
by mothers who stayed home full time, up 13 percent since 1994. See National Briefing Washington: Rise in
Stay-at-Home Parents, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2003, at A21. A new generation of mothers at home may now
emerge as “many women at the nation’s most elite colleges say they have already decided that they will put
aside their careers in favor of raising children.” Louise Story, Many Women at Elite Colleges Set Career Path
to Motherhood, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2005, at A1.
15
See JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA 100 (1986). Although economic assimilation is not a
goal common to all feminist perspectives, it has been widely expressed by a variety of liberal assimilationist
feminists. See National Organization for Women, Statement of Purpose (1966), in FEMINISM IN OUR TIME 95,
95-101 (Miriam Schneir ed., Vintage Books 1994). This liberal branch of feminism has many critics, even
within the feminist movement, partly because it “has appealed to bourgeois or middle-class women within
national movements, rather than to the millions of working-class, rural, and destitute women who make up the
majority of the world’s female population.” RAMAZANOGLU, supra note 5, at 16. Professor bell hooks notes
that many women were already working out of necessity before the contemporary feminist movement began; in
fact, women already made up one-third of the workforce, and the low wages of these “poor and working-class
women” failed to liberate them from male domination. HOOKS, supra note 7, at 48.
16
See DEMOCRACY UPSIDE DOWN: PUBLIC OPINION AND CULTURAL HEGEMONY IN THE UNITED STATES (Calvin
F. Exoo ed., 1987).
17
The characterization of housewives as “parasitic” did not, however, originate with contemporary feminism.
As early as the 19th century, Charlotte Perkins Gilman leveled the same accusation against homemakers.
CHARLOTTE PERKINS GILMAN, WOMEN AND ECONOMICS: A STUDY OF THE ECONOMIC RELATION BETWEEN
MEN AND WOMEN AS A FACTOR IN SOCIAL EVOLUTION (1898). Career women have also been characterized as
parasites by individuals who view male-female power dynamics as a zero-sum game; the success of the woman
is perceived as detracting from, and emasculating, her male counterpart. See, e.g., SUSAN J. DOUGLAS, WHERE
THE GIRLS ARE: GROWING UP FEMALE WITH THE MASS MEDIA 59 (1994). (“[T]here is a finite amount of
success allotted to any one male-female [celebrity] couple: the more she gets, the more he loses.”).
18
See Kathy McAfee & Myrna Wood, Bread and Roses, in FEMINISM IN OUR TIME, supra note 15, at 130, 134
(arguing that this stereotype has been leveled at all women in order to maintain separation between public and
private spheres). Many feminists have recognized intersections between the oppression of white women and
people of color. See, e.g., Kathleen Neal Cleaver, Racism, Civil Rights, and Feminism, in CRITICAL RACE
FEMINISM 48 (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 2003).; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal
Theory, supra at 34; Beverly Jones, Toward a Female Liberation Movement, in FEMINISM IN OUR TIME, supra
note 15, at 108, 108-24.
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self.19 Academic feminists told us that we “must be slightly ill mentally”20 to be happy in our
“parasitism” of traditional marriage,21 that “[d]omesticity was not a satisfactory story of an
intelligent woman's life,”22 and that we exist as “female impersonators,”23 simply fulfilling
the needs of others.24
This rhetoric had an almost daily impact on my life. I was energized by what I saw
as feminism’s war against the traditional family, with breadwinning husband and
homemaking wife.25 During the time that I was not domestically engaged, I researched these
issues over many years and eventually began writing my book, Domestic Tranquility: A Brief
Against Feminism.26 I lecture, give interviews, testify on divorce reform, and write on the
topic. I view these activities as a form of community service.
The institutionalization of the feminist ideology within our society has significantly
contributed to the numerous cultural dysfunctions now afflicting us. Our rates of sexually
transmitted diseases,27 abortion,28 and divorce are the highest in the western world, with one19

FRIEDAN, supra note 13, at 202-204.
JESSIE BERNARD, THE FUTURE OF MARRIAGE 56 (1972) (arguing that “[w]e do not clip wings or bind feet, but
we do make girls sick. For to be happy in a relationship which imposes so many impediments on her, as
traditional marriage does, a woman must be slightly ill mentally.”).
21
See id. at 253, 287. Interestingly, similar derogatory remarks had been made about unhappy homemakers.
For example, Betty Friedan points out that, prior to the feminist movement, women had been told that they were
mentally ill if they failed to gain satisfaction from their domestic life, and that those unsatisfied with domestic
life were considered “freaks” or “neurotics.” FRIEDAN, supra note 13, at 5. She dubbed the resulting housewife
depression “the problem that has no name.” Id. at 20.
22
ELIZABETH FOX-GENOVESE, “FEMINISM IS NOT THE STORY OF MY LIFE” 111-12 (1996).
23
CAROLYN G. HEILBRUN, WRITING A WOMAN’S LIFE 130 (1988).
24
Id. Feminists often have argued that, in order for women to fulfill their human potential, or at the least
achieve a more enlightened state of equality with men, women must, to some extent, shed some of their
responsibilities in the private sphere; accordingly, domestic concerns of housekeeping and childraising should
be divided in a more equitable manner. Herma Hill Kay, for example, encourages couples to recognize the
differences between childbearing, a task specific to women, and childraising, which can and should be done by
both parents. Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and its Aftermath,
56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 80-81 (1987).
25
For more of Mrs. Graglia’s discussion of this phenomenon, see GRAGLIA, DOMESTIC TRANQUILITY, supra
note 3, at 1-30.
26
Id.
27
According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”), there were 834,555 reported cases of
Chlamydia and 351,852 reported cases of gonorrhea in 2002. CDC, Sexually Transmitted Disease Surveillance
2002 Supplement, Atlanta, GA: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control
20
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half of our marriages now ending in divorce. 29 One out of three babies is now born out of
wedlock.30 Marriage and birth rates are at historic lows while rates of cohabitation steadily
increase.31

Contrary to all past history, men are refusing to marry the women they

impregnate, and there is now only a 50 percent chance that a child will reach adulthood with
the biological father in the home.32
Keenly aware of the dysfunctional culture in which they now live, “[f]emale college
students routinely identify ‘finding and keeping a loving partner’ as ‘the greatest obstacle to
women today.’”33 This concern is ranked above job discrimination, sexual harassment, and

and Prevention (Oct. 2003), available at http://www.cdc.gov/std/chlamydia2002/chlamydia2002.pdf and
http://www.cdc.gov/std/GISP2002/GISP2002.pdf. In 2000, between 850,000 and 950,000 people were living
with HIV. P.L. Fleming et al., HIV Prevalence in the United States, 2000, 9th Conference on Retroviruses and
Opportunistic
Infections,
Abstract
11
(Seattle,
Feb.
24-28,
2002),
available
at
http://www.retroconference.org/2002/Astract/13996.htm.
28
See Peter Uhlenberg & David Eggebeen, The Declining Well-Being of American Adolescents, in THE PUBLIC
INTEREST, 32-33 (1986). However, according to the CDC, rates of legal abortion in the United States have been
decreasing since 1990. Centers for Disease Control, National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and
Health Promotion, Division of Reproductive Health, Abortion Surveillance – United States, 2000. Table 2,
(Nov. 28, 2003), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ss5212a1.htm). A total of
1,429,247 legal abortions were reported in 1990. Id. By 1995, that total number had decreased to 1,210,883.
Id. In 2000, 857,475 legal abortions were reported. Id.
29
See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, Is Marriage Obsolete?, 10 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 189, 197 (2003) (“The divorce
rate in the United States has stabilized at an extremely high level; based on current divorce rates of 4.1 per
1,000 population in 2000, up from 2.5 in 1965; it is estimated that approximately one-half of all marriages will
end in divorce.”). Divorce rates rose from 1964 until they peaked in 1981; rates subsequently declined until
1998. See Ira Mark Ellman, Divorce Rates, Marriage Rates, and the Problematic Persistence of Traditional
Marital Roles, 34 FAM. L.Q. 1, 3-5 (2000) (arguing that the rise in divorce rates predated the move to no-fault
divorce); Ira Mark Ellman, The Misguided Movement to Revive Fault Divorce, and Why Reformers Should Look
Instead to the American Law Institute, 11 INT’L J.L., POL’Y & FAM. 216 (1997).
30
See LIONEL TIGER, THE DECLINE OF MALES 161 (1999); Wardle, supra note 29, at 196 (“By 2000, nearly
one-third of all children born in the United States were born out of wedlock, a thirteen-fold increase in the
number of nonmarital births in just over fifty years.”).
31
See Wardle, supra note 29, at 196-97; Eric P. Voigt, Reconsidering the Mythical Advantages of Cohabitation:
Why Marriage is More Efficient than Cohabitation, 78 IND. L.J. 1069, 1069 (2003).
32
See TIGER, supra note 30, at 49. Cf. Tracy L. McGaugh, Generation X in Law School: The Dying of the Light
or the Dawn of a New Day?, 9 LEGAL WRITING 119, 129 (2003) (“Because of the rising divorce rate, nearly half
of all Xers were raised in single-parent households.”); Lynn D. Wardle, Relationships Between Family and
Government, 31 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 1, 13 (2000) (“[M]ore than one-half of all children in America will spend a
‘significant’ part of their childhood (before they turn eighteen) living apart from their fathers.”).
33
Jennifer Grossman, Anarchy in Eros; Where the Men Went, THE AMERICAN SPECTATOR 57-58 (June/July
2003) (discussing BARBARA DAFOE WHITEHEAD, WHY THERE ARE NO GOOD MEN LEFT: THE ROMANTIC
PLIGHT OF THE NEW SINGLE WOMAN (2003)); cf. Cheryl Hanna, Bad Girls and Good Sports: Some Reflections
on Violent Female Juvenile Delinquents, Title IX & the Promise of Girl Power, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 667,
706 (2000) (“[W]hat many young women fear most is not career failure or illness or the loss of their female
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domestic violence.34

In most college women's studies departments, however, such

confessions are viewed as heresy. These departments applaud professional ambition but
ridicule matrimonial motivations as being inconsistent with the feminist equation of
domesticity with oppression.35
Writer Anne Taylor Fleming illustrates the continuing harm of feminist initiatives in
her recent advice to June brides on the Jim Lehrer News Hour.36 Her essay included a
warning to brides that “it’s best to make your own money. Some of us learned that the hard
way.”37

The fact that it is socially and economically perilous for women to become

homemakers is a direct result of our no-fault divorce regime,38 which feminists continue to
support in order to force women to abandon homemaking for market production.39 Despite
the evidence that liberalization of divorce laws weakens marriages and leaves many women
and children increasingly vulnerable,40 feminists strenuously resist divorce reform efforts

friendships. They fear being forty and single” (citing a study in PEGGY ORENSTEIN, FLUX: WOMEN ON SEX,
WORK, LOVE, KIDS, AND LIFE IN A HALF-CHANGED WORLD, 237-58 (2000)).
34
Grossman, supra note 33.
35
Id. at 58.
36
Interview by Jim Lehrer with Anne Taylor Fleming. Essayist Anne Taylor Fleming Contemplates June
Brides (PBS television broadcast June 20, 2003), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/essays/janjune03/fleming_06-20.html.
37
Id.
38
Mrs. Graglia argues that:
[a] primary factor contributing to the feminization of poverty has been the change to a
system of no-fault divorce under which divorce is easily obtained, even when opposed
by one of the parties, and men are often able to terminate marriages without providing
adequate alimony or child support.
GRAGLIA, DOMESTIC TRANQUILITY, supra note 3, at 295. See also JOHANNA BRENNER, WOMEN AND THE
POLITICS OF CLASS 105-09 (2000) (examining ways that class, race, and gender affect the post-divorce quality
of life for men and women); LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION 338-39 (1985) (demonstrating
that the standard of living rises for post-divorce men and declines for post-divorce women). Cf. Kay, supra
note 24, at 74-84 (ascribing this gendered divergence of post-divorce living standards to injustices in
implementation of no-fault divorce laws, though not the no-fault regime itself, as well as women’s decisions to
conform to traditional gender divisions of labor). Other causes of lower economic status of divorced women
include failure to enforce support awards. See DOROTHY MCBRIDE STETSON, WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN THE U.S.A.:
POLICY DEBATES AND GENDER ROLES 203-05 (2d ed. 1997).
39
For more of Mrs. Graglia’s discussion of this issue, see GRAGLIA, DOMESTIC TRANQUILITY, supra note 3, at
136-137, 264.
40
See PAUL R. AMATO & ALAN BOOTH, A GENERATION AT RISK: GROWING UP IN AN ERA OF FAMILY
UPHEAVAL 81-82, 107-09, 172-74, 181 (1997) (also finding that “low marital quality” between parents causes
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because if given a choice to be homemakers (and therefore dependent on their husbands),
many women would make that choice.41

Thus, Professor Herma Hill Kay argues for

retention of no-fault divorce because, she says, women must “recognize that their unique role
in reproduction ends with childbirth” and that, “like men,” women “should be able to lead
productive independent lives outside the family.”42 To the women who argue that they do
not want to leave their children with another woman in order to lead those productive
independent lives, feminists reply that these women suffer from “false consciousness”43 and
that their preferences are socially constructed.44 These women have internalized their own

problems for children); Andrea Brobeil, Marriage and Divorce, 5 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 529, 540 n.52 (2004)
(citing to supportive sources and acknowledging an opposing argument); Aspasia Tsaoussis, Protecting
Homemakers’ Marriage-Specific Investments under No-fault Divorce, 6 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 217, 220-22,
229-37 (2004) (examining the impact of the introduction of no-fault divorce on homemakers in long-term,
traditional marriages in Greece.).
41
See Martha Heller, Should Breaking-Up Be Harder to Do?: The Ramifications a Return to Fault-Based
Divorce Would Have upon Domestic Violence, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 263, 281 (1996) (rejecting divorce
reforms because they “would undermine any such strategy of equalizing parenting roles within the family. If
once again given the option of relying on marriage for lifelong support in order to allow the assumption of
traditional gender roles, many women undoubtedly will be more likely to choose this option”); Kay, supra note
26, at 78-80, 90 (although conceding that “many couples still choose to follow the traditional allocation of
family functions by sex,” Kay warns that changes in no-fault divorce laws “may inadvertently perpetuate female
dependence by proposing solutions that might encourage future women to continue to select traditional roles”);
Sex, Society and the Female Dilemma: A Dialogue Between Simone de Beauvoir and Betty Friedan, SATURDAY
REV., June 14, 1975, at 14, 18 [hereinafter Dialogue] (in which Simone de Beauvoir comments that women
should not be given the choice to stay home and raise children “precisely because if there is such a choice, too
many women will make that one.”).
42
Kay, supra note 24, at 84-85. Although Professor Kay does not advocate a return to the era of “fault” divorce,
she does identify elements of no-fault divorce laws and their implementation that result in post-divorce
inequality. Id. at 55-77.
43
See Williams, supra note 14, at 1470 (criticizing the feminist focus on “false consciousness”).
44
Tracy E. Higgins, Democracy and Feminism, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1657, 1690 (1997). In fact, some women
who choose to be full-time mothers may believe that they are compelled to make that choice. See Marion G.
Crain, Feminizing Unions: Challenging the Gendered Structure of Wage Labor, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1155, 1179
(1991) (“The unavailability and expense of child care leaves many working women no choice but to stay home
and care for their children until they reach school age”); Lorraine Schmall, Introduction, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV.
1, 19-20 (1998) (“Many women do not make the choice to stay at home but stay at home because they have too
many children, aged family members to care for, an economic disincentive to go to work because of the cost of
‘surrogate parents’ for their children, a lack of interest in or qualification for outside employment, or maybe
even cultural demands.”); Pamela Stone & Meg Lovejoy, Fast-Track Women and the “Choice” to Stay Home,
596 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 62, 80 (2004) (“Our results undermine the notion that women are
freely choosing family over work. Inflexible and highly demanding workplaces are the major barriers to their
ability to exercise discretion in any meaningful way.”).
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oppression, and “may not be the best judges of their own interests or those of the
community.”45 Such is feminist hubris.
A brief personal story illustrates how some women have suffered as a result of
following the feminist path. Anne Taylor Fleming was everything the feminist movement
encouraged her to be. She was a young sexual revolutionary who became the trophy wife of
a man whom she had met when she was in high school; that man divorced the mother of his
four young sons in order to marry her.46 Ms. Fleming concentrated for many years on
advancing her career and is now a childless journalist; she describes herself as belonging to the
47

“sisterhood of the infertile.”

In her book, Motherhood Deferred: A Woman's Journey, she

eloquently describes the experience of having sex with a syringe of sperm and a petri dish in
countless failed attempts to “trade a byline for a baby.”48

She depicts women of her

generation as the ones who rejected “motherhood and dishes and diapers” of the “traditional
wifely role”49 in order to become “the golden girls of the brave new order.”50 They instead
became, she laments, the “Sacrificial Generation.”51
With the words “Sorry. Sorry. Sorry,”52 Fleming apologizes in her book to the
women she calls “the station-wagon moms with their postpartum pounds who felt denigrated
in the liberationist heyday by the young, lean, ambitious women like me.”53 One must
wonder if she is apologizing to the wife and mother whom she supplanted so many years ago.

45

Higgins, supra note 44, at 1696.
ANNE TAYLOR FLEMING, MOTHERHOOD DEFERRED: A WOMAN’S JOURNEY 102-03 (1994).
47
Id. at 13, 115. Fleming writes of wanting to shout “Hey, hey, Gloria! Germaine! Kate! Tell us, how does it
feel to have ended up without babies, children, flesh of your flesh? Did you mean it to happen that way?” Id. at
16.
48
Id. at 17.
49
Id. at 25.
50
Id. at 26.
51
Id. at 87.
52
Id. at 17.
53
Id. at 17.
46
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That woman became, in Fleming's description, “one of those heartland moms who ended up
in a development of tract houses with four little blond boys”54 – another homemaker who
learned the hard way about the perils of divorce.
How can we say that contemporary feminism has advanced the position of women in
our society when it has supported no-fault divorce,55 the sexual revolution,56 and the
glamorizing of market production at the expense of domesticity?57 All of these have led to
broken marriages, wives and mothers who are devalued and abandoned, fatherless children,
childless women, unmarried women, and young women of either the bimbo or brainy variety
who are regarded as trophies advertising older men's success. This is the legacy of the
feminist engine of reform that I seek to derail. Thank you.

54

Id. at 207; see also SYLVIA ANN HEWLETT, CREATING A LIFE: PROFESSIONAL WOMEN AND THE QUEST FOR
CHILDREN (2002) (analyzing the lives of these women and the choices many of them now regret, noting that
more than a third of highly paid professional women over 40 are childless).
55
See supra notes 38 - 42 and accompanying text.
56
Some feminists observed parallels between what they contend are the political and sexual oppression of
women and encouraged women to explore their own sexuality. See Germaine Greer, Our Bodies, in FEMINISM
IN OUR TIME, supra note 15, at 343, 345-50.
57
See The National Organization for Women, Statement of Purpose, in FEMINISM IN OUR TIME, supra note 15,
at 95, 95-102. William Ophuls, a former political science professor at Northwestern University and former
member of the U.S. Foreign Service, notes the following with respect to the ascendance of women as economic
actors in the market:
[t]he usual way of putting it is to say that women have escaped an anomalous and
inferior status to take their rightful place in the modern world. But it would probably
be more accurate to say that capitalism has finally succeeded in incorporating the last
major class to resist the blandishments of the market system. In consequence, as
increasing numbers of women (especially elite women) embrace economic values and
attempt to live life in imitation of liberal men, positive feminine values are diluted and
negative masculine values reinforced, with harmful consequences both to society and
to the women themselves. Indeed, the sum of gains to individual women (again,
mostly elite women) from increased wealth, status, and power may well be outweighed
by the long-run social costs of women’s liberation . . . . The women’s liberation
movement therefore epitomizes the tragedy of liberalism in general: individuals get
what they want—the satisfaction of private desire—but only by destroying their
natural and social environments.
WILLIAM OPHULS, REQUIEM FOR MODERN POLITICS 52 (1997).
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PROFESSOR KENNEDY: Good morning. I teach a variety of courses relating to women
and the law.58 Much of my perspective on feminism is integrated into the courses that I teach
as well as my research. My ideas about feminism are more simple, yet at the same time a bit
more complex, than Carolyn’s views: I believe that feminism speaks to a more diverse range
of individuals and issues than the ones Carolyn expressed in her introduction. Martha
Chamallas explains that:
[f]eminist legal theory responds to a basic insight about life and law. It
proceeds from the assumption that gender is important in our everyday
lives . . . whether we are pleased or distressed by the thought of gender
difference.59
I find the reach and diversity of feminist thought to be intellectually challenging and
relevant to my life in significant ways. I am drawn to concepts of feminism and critical legal
thought not primarily from theory but primarily from looking at the lives of the women that I
knew growing up. As a recent immigrant to the United States, my mother worked. She
worked in a toy factory when we very young.

She also worked the late shifts at an

orphanage, in the infirmary, caring for children with no homes, while my father worked the
day shift. She left for work around 2:30 in the afternoon and returned home in the middle of
the night, after my siblings and I had fallen asleep. In my life, feminism meant that you
worked and that you were an equal contributor to the family income. In order to have a
house with a small yard and enable her children go to school, my mother had to work. She
did not have the option to stay home with her children; neither did her mother.60
58

See supra note 4.
CHAMALLAS, supra note 12, at xix.
60
Narratives like the one related here have been and are prevalent and important in feminist scholarship and
teaching.
The experiences of those at the bottom are often, but not necessarily, articulated as narratives, in a
process of storytelling. Feminist narratives may have aesthetic value, but their purposes are also often
political. “They may be a bridge to those who share a similar vision, or a means of inciting change
59
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This scenario is in no way new or unique. Many women have worked throughout
history out of necessity, because they had no choice;61 many women still do not always have
choices.62 For me, feminism is about empowering women to discover a greater diversity of
choices and increased opportunities for equality, and it is about women making free choices
about their own lives.63 Yes, it is also about privilege,64 which I think is the element of
among those who do not.” Moreover, the ostensible “neutrality” of the law disguises the extent to
which it is premised on the perspectives of the powerful; the narratives of those who occupy a
comparatively powerless position are not only evidence of what has been excluded, but testimony to
the law's relentless perspectivity. Finally, feminist narratives reflect the feminist epistemological
challenge to “the ‘scientific rationality’ that prevails in our society—and in our legal argumentation—
privileges universality, statistical significance, and logical deduction as ways of knowing about the
world.”
Dana Raigrodski, Breaking Out of “Custody”: A Feminist Voice in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 36 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1301, 1311 (1999) (footnotes omitted); see also Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79
CAL. L. REV. 971 (1991); sources cited infra note 70. The use of narratives in legal scholarship has been
subject to thoughtful critique. See Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The 200,000 Cards of Dimitri Yurasov:
Further Reflections on Scholarship and Truth, 46 STAN. L. REV. 647 (1994); Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna
Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993).
61
See STETSON, supra note 38, at 219. Since 1900, women never constituted “less than 19 percent of the paid
workforce” in the United States. Id. at 217. Stetson notes that “more minority women than white women have
worked.” Id. at 218. Author, professor, and cultural critic bell hooks argues that capitalism, not feminism, is
the true reason that women have been pushed into the workforce.
Masses of women feel angry because they were encouraged by feminist thinking to
believe they would find liberation in the workforce. Mostly they have found that they
work long hours at home and long hours at the job. Even before [the] feminist
movement encouraged women to feel positive about working outside the home, the
needs of a depressed economy were already sanctioning this shift. If [the]
contemporary feminist movement had never taken place masses of women would still
have entered the workforce, but it is unlikely that we would have the rights we have,
had feminists not challenged gender discrimination. Women are wrong to “blame”
feminism for making it so they have to work, which is what many women think. The
truth remains that consumer capitalism was the force leading more women into the
workforce. Given the depressed economy white middle-class families would be
unable to sustain their class status and their lifestyles if women who had once dreamed
solely of working as housewives had not chosen to work outside the home.
HOOKS, supra note 7, at 49-50.
62
Joel F. Handler, Institutional Barriers to Women in the Workplace: Women, Families, Work, and Poverty: A
Cloudy Future, 6 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 375 (1996) (discussing the plight of women facing part-time work and
dead-end jobs).
63
Gloria Steinem, for example, agrees that increasing women’s equality and the range of women’s choices are
important goals of modern feminism because:
[w]hether the struggle is as clear-cut as an individual woman’s right to equal pay—and
to decide for herself when and whether she will have a child—or as complex as the
cross-cultural principles of economic equity and reproductive freedom, the issues still
repeat themselves in different ways and in constantly shifting arenas.
Gloria Steinem, The Way We Were—And Will Be, in FEMINISM IN OUR TIME, supra note 15, 408, 410. See also
ANN CRITTENDEN, THE PRICE OF MOTHERHOOD 233-255 (2001) (examining realities of women’s “choices”).
Kingsley Browne, however, argues that women actually have more choices than men.
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feminism that Carolyn is speaking about. I think her comments have a great degree of
legitimacy relating to what I call “power” or “liberal” feminism, a narrow perspective that
presents valid points about the interests of middle class white women.65 However, feminism
is also about environmental justice.66 It is about work, families, race, class, and poverty.67 It
is about making clear the public importance of violence and domestic abuse of women and
children,68 and it is about empowering survivors of sexual harassment and rape.69 It is about

It is ironic that feminists seize on the lack-of-choice argument, since women have a
much broader range of work/family choices than men do. A woman can choose to be
a ‘career primary’ worker, a ‘career and family’ worker, a part-time worker, or a fulltime housewife; all of these are socially respected choices. Men, on the other hand,
have little choice at all. They are expected to be full-time workers who, in most
circumstances, are the primary family breadwinners.
KINGSLEY BROWNE, DIVIDED LABOURS: AN EVOLUTIONARY VIEW OF WOMEN AT WORK 55 (1999).
64
See STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN, Making Systems of Privilege Visible, in PRIVILEGE REVEALED: HOW INVISIBLE
PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA (1996).
65
See RAMAZANOGLU, supra note 5, at 17-19 (discussing the “gulfs between privileged women who can
exercise considerable choice over the course of their lives and women who have to struggle alongside men for
their subsistence, let alone for any further rights”). The liberal feminist approach has been challenged for its
narrow focus by, among others, critical race feminists. See Harris, supra note 18, at 34-41; Cleaver, supra note
18, at 48, 52.
66
A variety of ecofeminist perspectives have examined the interrelationship between women and the natural
world. For example, some ecofeminists argue that feminism and environmentalism are linked because of the
particularly devastating effects of environmental degradation on women. See, e.g., CAROLYN MERCHANT,
EARTHCARE: WOMEN AND THE ENVIRONMENT 160-65, 189, 194-94 (1996) (examining the ways in which
ecological destruction disproportionately impacts women, particularly women of color and women living in
poverty).
Others argue that feminism and environmentalism are linked because the same masculine,
paternalistic values arguably oppress both women and nature. See Deborah Slicer, Your Daughter or Your
Dog? A Feminist Assessment of the Animal Research Issue, in ECOLOGICAL FEMINIST PHILOSOPHIES 97, 101
(Karen J. Warren ed., 1996). Others suggest that ecofeminism naturally flows from women’s close relationship
to the cycles of the natural world, a position that is critically examined by Catherine Roach. Catherine Roach,
Loving Your Mother: On the Woman-Nature Relation, in ECOLOGICAL FEMINIST PHILOSOPHIES supra, at 52.
67
See supra note 65. See also BRENNER, supra note 38, at 101-61 (discussing welfare and the feminization of
poverty); HOOKS, supra note 7, at 51 (identifying poverty as “a central woman’s issue”).
68
See HOOKS, supra note 7, at 61 (noting that the “contemporary feminist movement was the force that
dramatically uncovered and exposed the ongoing reality of domestic violence.”); Jenny Rivera, Domestic
Violence Against Latinas by Latino Males: An Analysis of Race, National Origin, and Gender Differentials, 14
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 231 (1994).
69
See SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN, AND RAPE (Ballantine Books 1993) (1975);
KATHA POLLITT, REASONABLE CREATURES 29-30 (1994) (examining the phenomenon of male violence and
advocating increased recognition of the “casual hostility to women such men usually display long before they
rape or kill.”); Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087 (1986). According to the Department of Justice,
670,000 women were victims of rape or sexual assault in the two-year period from 1995 to 1996. BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY (U.S. Dept. of Justice 1997).
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putting on the public agenda issues that are of a concern to women and to children.70
Mothers, in particular, who take up issues of concern to their own children are by nature
feminists, whether they like the label or not, because they actively bring to the floor issues
that women, as mothers, think are important.71
Feminism has allowed me to have a complex identification of self.

Although

Carolyn's introduction focused on women's entry into the workplace as a driving force behind
feminism, motherhood and race are my primary focuses in life. Feminist theorist bell hooks,
who has influenced me greatly throughout my life, says quite simply that “[f]eminism is for
everybody.”72 She states:
[i]magine living in a world where there is no domination, where females
and males are not alike or even always equal, but where a vision of
mutuality is the ethos shaping our interaction. Imagine living in a world
where we can all be who we are, a world of peace and possibility.73
She goes on to say:
[f]eminist revolution alone will not create such a world; we need to end
racism, class elitism, imperialism. But it will make it possible for us to
be fully self-actualized females and males able to create beloved
community, to live together, realizing our dreams of freedom and
justice, living the truth that we are all “created equal.”74

70

Scholars have noted the importance of women’s experiences to feminist scholarship. See Patricia A. Cain,
Feminist Legal Scholarship, 77 IOWA L. REV. 19, 20 (1991); Thomas Ross, Despair and Redemption in the
Feminist Nomos, 69 IND. L.J. 101, 106 (1993); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Hearing Women Not Being Heard: On
Carol Gilligan's Getting Civilized and the Complexity of Voice, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 33, 35 n.11 (1994); Jane
M. Spinak, Reflections on a Case (of Motherhood), 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1990, 2049 (1995). For example, the
Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000), grew out of a feminist push for parental leave.
Joanna L. Grossman, Job Security Without Equality: The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 15 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL'Y 17, 45-46 (2004). Childcare has been another area where feminists have pushed for reform. See
STETSON, supra note 38, at 275-84.
71
For a cross-cultural examination of activist mothers, see THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD: ACTIVIST VOICES
FROM LEFT TO RIGHT (Alexis Jetter et al. eds., 1997).
72
HOOKS, supra note 7, at 118.
73
Id. at x.
74
Id.
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I hope that, through this conversation, we can examine different kinds of exploitation
and domination and begin to talk about interconnected issues75 like sexism,76 racism,77 and
heterosexism.78 We can discuss how critical schools of legal thought, feminism included,
have opened our minds to important legal, social, and cultural issues that affect people’s
ability to make meaningful real-world choices.79 Thank you.

PROFESSOR BARTOW: I do not come here as a feminist scholar, per se; that is not how I
define myself. I teach intellectual property, or “IP.” I learned the need for caution when
using legal acronyms around children the hard way. When I say “IP” out loud, I am referring
to intellectual property, but a room full of young children, including my son, will
misunderstand the phonetics (I pee) and find hilarious potty humor connotations.
In any event, although my teaching and practice have primarily dealt with intellectual
property, I was identified for this panel because of some work I did in law school as a
75

Because of the interconnected ways that individuals can experience oppression, it is often important to
examine “how race, class, and gender intersect[] in multiple ways to create distinctive forms of discrimination
for specific subgroups of women” and how “different forms of discrimination may be mutually reinforcing.”
CHAMALLAS, supra note 12, at 28. See also BRENNER, supra note 38, at 293-318 (examining intersectionality
from a Marxist perspective).
76
See, e.g., Maryann Ayim & Barbara Houston, A Conceptual Analysis of Sexism and Sexist Education, THE
GENDER QUESTION IN EDUCATION: THEORY, PEDAGOGY, AND POLITICS 9, 9-23 (Ann Diller et al. eds., 1996)
(summarizing and evaluating various definitions of “sexism”).
77
See supra note 18.
78
Feminism and feminist legal theory have been characterized as and criticized for being heterosexually biased.
Feminist legal theory will need to expand its horizons and make itself consciously, more consistently,
and expressly inclusive. . . . [E]ven though Feminism in the law has challenged androsexist biases,
Feminist legal critiques generally have overlooked or underemphasized heterosexist biases in law and
society; on the whole, Feminist legal work simply has failed to account for the experiences of sexual
minorities, particularly lesbians and bisexual women, in the development of Feminist legal theory.
Consequently, Feminist critiques of law have missed nuances that could sharpen, broaden, or texture
its insights, and along the way also have missed opportunities for empowerment through coalition.
Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of “Sex,” “Gender,”
and “Sexual Orientation” in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 3, 373 (1995) (footnotes
omitted); see also Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen: A Racial Critique of Gay and Lesbian Legal
Theory and Political Discourse, 29 CONN. L. REV. 561, 585 n.105 (1997) (describing and citing to lesbian
critiques of feminists and political activists); Frances Olsen, Politics Without a Movement, 22 CARDOZO L. REV.
1105, 1108 n.13 (2001) (“There is little reason to believe that the American feminist movement was any further
advanced than the rest of society on issues of heterosexism than it was on issues of racism.”).
79
See CHAMALLAS, supra note 12; Harris, supra note 18, at 34; Cleaver, supra note 18, at 52.
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feminist legal scholar—I subsequently had little involvement with gender scholarship until a
few years ago, when some colleagues prevailed upon me to participate in a symposium at the
University of Kansas revisiting the article Becoming Gentleman by Lani Guinier,80 to which I
had contributed.81 I was initially concerned that my focus on intellectual property law might
be incompatible with the subject matter. I felt in some sense that, as someone who writes
primarily in the intellectual property law field, I am not really a woman any more, in a
scholarly sense. However, one of my co-panelists at the symposium affirmatively—and
somewhat sarcastically—welcomed me back to feminist legal theory, knowing full well I’d
never really left. She said, “One can find gender issues everywhere one looks.”
I have found this observation to be true, even in intellectual property law and practice.
For example, in copyright law, the invocation of stereotypes is generally an easy way to
avoid infringement lawsuits. There is a copyright doctrine called “scenes a faire,” which
says, basically, that stereotypes are out there for everybody to use; they can’t be individually
owned.82 It is slightly ironic, because you would not necessarily think of copyright laws as
enforcing stereotypes; but, in fact, a prudent lawyer would advise a client that using well
known stock characters and stereotypes might prevent liability for infringement.83

80

Lani Guinier et al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women’s Experiences at One Ivy League Law School, 143 U. PA.
L. REV. 1 (1994) [hereinafter Guinier, Women’s Experiences]. That article later evolved into a book: LANI
GUINIER ET AL., BECOMING GENTLEMEN: WOMEN, LAW SCHOOL, AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (1997)
[hereinafter GUINIER, BECOMING GENTLEMEN]. For Professor Bartow’s more recent article on this topic, see
Ann Bartow, Still Not Behaving like Gentlemen, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 809 (2001).
81
Lani Guinier writes that the research began when Ann Bartow, then a student in her third year at the
University of Pennsylvania Law School, asked her to supervise an independent study project dealing with
gender stereotypes. Guinier, Women’s Experiences, supra note 80, at 6-9. As part of the research for that
project, Ann surveyed her fellow students; the surprisingly gendered results of the survey inspired the resulting
literature. Id.
82
See Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 323 F.3d 763 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding the doctrine applicable to
photographs of Skyy vodka bottles); Ivan Hoffman, Scenes a Faire under Copyright Law (2003),
http://www.ivanhoffman.com/scenes.html (describing the Ets-Hokin case).
83
See generally Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 659 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding that a “stock character is a
stock example of the operation of the doctrine” of scenes a faire and therefore is not protected); Atari Games
Corp. v. Oman, 888 F.2d 878, 886 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (stating that “[t]he term scenes a faire refers to stereotyped
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I do not want to push anybody to think too hard this morning, especially the women
in the audience with delicate reproductive organs that might be damaged if their brains are
overtaxed.84 However, in addressing briefly some of Carolyn’s introductory remarks, when I
look around at the world outside the United States, I cannot help but notice that feminism and
female employment are not always accompanied by the high rates of divorce and abortion
that we experience here.85 I want to quickly focus on abortion as one example. I believe that

expressions, ‘incidents, characters or settings which are as a practical matter indispensable, or at least standard,
in the treatment of a given topic.’” (emphasis omitted) (citing Alexander v. Haley, 460 F. Supp. 40, 45
(S.D.N.Y. 1978))); Sinicola v. Warner Bros., 948 F. Supp. 1176, 1190 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (“Copyright . . . does
not afford exclusive protection to the various themes, characters, and settings shared to some extent by the
works and upon which plaintiff relies . . . . Similarities in the works as to these themes, characters, and settings
are too general or trivial or are stereotyped expression amounting to unprotectible scenes a faire.” (emphasis
omitted)).
84
At one time, intellectual and political activity were widely believed to have detrimental effects on a woman’s
body and reproductive potential. Susan Marshall discusses the antifeminist argument against women’s suffrage
in the early 20th century:
[t]he erosion of separate spheres challenged scientific law, and The Woman’s Protest
published expert testimony that political activity would strain the delicate female
nervous system and lead to infertility or defective offspring.
Susan Marshall, In Defense of Separate Spheres: Class and Status Politics in the Antisuffrage Movement, 65
SOC. FORCES 327, 334 (1986) (citing Julia D. Henry, A Plea for Real Progress, THE WOMAN’S PROTEST
[3(2):3] (1913)). See also EDWARD H. CLARKE, SEX IN EDUCATION: OR, A FAIR CHANCE FOR THE GIRLS (1873).
Echoes of this mindset can be found in modern critiques of women’s participation in the public sphere; the idea
remains that women must choose between children and work. For example, Mrs. Graglia writes:
[a] woman’s ability fully to exercise and enjoy her reproductive capabilities depends
on the breadwinner ethic. Without this ethic, she is forced to participate in
marketplace activities that require her to curtail and diminish her reproductive
accomplishments. To serve the interests of traditional women, therefore, it is
necessary to revive the eroded breadwinner ethic.
GRAGLIA, DOMESTIC TRANQUILITY, supra note 3, at 156-157.
85
U.S. divorce rates are among the highest in the world. See Marleen O'Connor-Felman, American Corporate
Governance and Children: Investing in Our Future Human Capital During Turbulent Times, 77 S. CAL. L. REV.
1258, 1320 (2004) (“the United States (1) has taken the most dramatic steps towards flexible labor markets and
(2) has among the highest rates of divorce and women's workforce participation.”). But see Louise Falconer,
The Mother Country and Her Colonial Progeny, 7 L. TEXT CULTURE 149, 162 (2003) (noting that “Australia
had a greater incidence of abortion that either the United States or the United Kingdom.”). However, the
relationship among the rates of women in the workplace, abortion, and divorce in any country are complex due
to the interaction of law, culture, and religion. See, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig, The Role of Socioeconomics in
Teaching Family Law, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 177, 180-86 (2004) (illuminating the interaction between the
divorce rate and various other socioeconomic forces); Jayanth Kumar Krishnan, Public Interest Litigation in a
Comparative Context, 20 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 19, 36-41 (2001-2002) (noting the complex relationship in Israel
among law, culture, and religion in controlling women’s employment, abortions, and divorce); Joel Richard
Paul, Cultural Resistance to Global Governance, 22 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 83 n.373 (2000) (“[G]ains to women in
the marketplace often are not matched by legal reforms in the private sphere. For example, . . . Chile has
guaranteed equal employment opportunities for women, but has resisted efforts to liberalize women's
reproductive rights and access to divorce.”).
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the high abortion rates in the United States have more to do with the unavailability of birth
control or the lack of birth control education than the influence of feminism;86 many other
societies have addressed these issues more effectively than we have.87

I also do not

understand the link that is made between feminism and the sexual revolution; I do not think
that feminism tries to tell women what kind of sex to have or not have.88
I have one final observation, and it relates to women and law teaching. Before I first
started teaching at the University of South Carolina, I had taught for two years at a different
86

See Sylvia A. Law, Abortion Compromise—Inevitable and Impossible, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 921, 938 (1992)
(“expanded sex education and contraceptive availability surely could reduce the need for abortion”); Mary V.
Rorty & Joann V. Pinkerton, Elective Fetal Reduction: The Ultimate Elective Surgery, 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH
L. & POL'Y 53, 72 (1996) (“[E]very abortion represents a failure of contraception, education, or social support,
and sometimes all three.”); Katherine C. Sheehan, The Hand That Rocks the Cradle, 32 U. TOL. L. REV. 229,
242 n.95 (2001) (“Improved education in contraception and reproduction might address some of the conditions
that cause teenaged girls to need abortions after the eighth week of pregnancy.”).
87
See Maria Sophia Aguirre & Ann Wolfgram, United Nations Policy and the Family: Redefining the Ties that
Bind: A Study of History, Forces and Trends, 16 BYU J. PUB. L. 113, 115 n.5 (2002) (“In the late 1990s, several
Latin American countries introduced, and in some cases even approved, laws that quoted directly, or followed
closely, UN international conferences of the 1990s. Examples of such laws include the sexual and reproductive
health education programs in Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, and Argentina.”); Elof D.B. Johansson,
Comparison of the Availability of Contraceptive Methods in Selected European Countries and the United
States, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 471 (1997) (describing then existing differences in the availability of
contraceptives in the United States and various European countries); Sheldon Segal, Introduction, 23 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 329, 329-30 (1997) (“It is widely recognized that American women have fewer
contraceptive choices than European women.”); but see Terri E. Owens, Comment, The Abortion Question:
Germany's Dilemma Delays Unification, 53 LA. L. REV. 1315, 1323 (1993) (noting, with respect to the former
Soviet Union, that “[t]he enormous scale of abortion is more a result of the unavailability of adequate
contraception than any respect for the right of women to control their bodies.”).
88
The debate on this subject is as colorful as it is varied. Some feminists argue that women must liberate
themselves from repressive sexual double standards (that allow promiscuity in men but not in women) in order
to achieve true equality, rhetoric that was influential on many women’s sexual decisions:
[i]n 1960, when the federal government approved the use of the birth control pill, the
incipient sexual revolution shifted into higher gear. Growing numbers of unmarried
women began to stake out their right to enjoy sex for pleasure rather than for
procreation. Those who rebelled eagerly embraced their sexual freedom, happy to
explore the pleasures of the body, and seduced by the hope that “free love” would lead
to a fulfilling life.
RUTH ROSEN, THE WORLD SPLIT OPEN: HOW THE MODERN WOMEN’S MOVEMENT CHANGED AMERICA 55
(2000). Others have criticized the notion that equality ever can be found through heterosexual desire, which a
lesbian feminist has defined as “eroticized power difference” that imprisons women in a sexual role defined by
submission to men. Sheila Jeffreys, Anticlimax, in WOMEN’S STUDIES: ESSENTIAL READINGS 243, 243 (Stevi
Jackson et al. eds., 1993). She argues that “[t]he demolition of heterosexual desire is a necessary step on the
route to women’s liberation.” Id. Others have argued that individuals must be empowered to make their own
sexual decisions, whatever those decisions might be. See, e.g., bell hooks, Ending Female Sexual Oppression,
in WOMEN’S STUDIES: ESSENTIAL READINGS, supra, at 245, 245 (arguing that “feminist activists committed to
ending sexual oppression must work to eliminate the oppression of lesbians and gay men as part of an overall
movement to enable all women (and men) to freely choose sexual partners.”).
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law school in the Midwest. When I arrived, I found the culture of South Carolina to be quite
different. Although the school was ultimately a good fit for me, and I am now very happy to
be there, my first semester was a little rocky. Somehow, I didn’t seem to have the authority
in the classroom that I’d had previously. One student in particular in the first class that I
taught at South Carolina behaved arrogantly and disrespectfully and gave me a really hard
time all semester. I was therefore quite surprised when he signed up for both of the classes I
taught the following spring. Also, ironically enough, he graduated three years ago and still
keeps in touch with me. In the first e-mail message that he sent to me, he said, “Professor, I
don't know if you remember me.” I certainly did.
Through our subsequent communications, I learned that he had been a science major
at a small southern school with very few female professors and students.

Even at our law

school, he managed to get through two full academic years without having taken a class
taught by any of the female law professors.89 I was his first model of a woman teaching law,
which may help explain our tension during that first semester. I think that I really taught him
something during our classes together; not only did I teach him intellectual property law, but
I also taught him that I could teach him intellectual property law. He went off to work at a
large firm, where he interacted with female partners, co-workers, and judges. I think that his
positive experiences in my classes helped to acclimate him to the idea that women are
capable of being competent professionals. Thank you.
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PROFESSOR HEMINWAY:

I thank our panelists for those important reflections,

particularly regarding the interconnections between their work and their lives. I will begin
the “Question & Answer” portion of the program with a brief discussion of the intersection
of gender, law, and consumerism. Ann, I want to focus first on trademark law. You
submitted a draft paper for the Association of American Law Schools’ June 2003 workshop
on Taking Stock: Women of All Colors in Law School.90 In that paper, you suggest that
courts adjudicating trademark actions may “perceive female consumers as especially easily
confused,"91 and that “trademark holders intentionally or unconsciously exploit this bias
when litigating trademark infringement and trademark dilution disputes.”92 Can you briefly
explain the thesis of your paper and its context?

PROFESSOR BARTOW: As an introduction, trademark law requires that the plaintiff’s
lawyer must convince the fact-finder—a jury, or, more often, a judge—that consumers are
likely to confuse two identical or similar products identified with the same or similar
trademarks in order to establish an infringement claim.93 After examining numerous cases,
you begin to notice disparities in the jurisprudence that can play out in several different ways.
90
Ann Bartow, Trademark Law and Gendered Confusion, http://www.aals.org/profdev/women/bartow.pdf
[hereinafter Bartow, Trademark Law]. A revised version of this paper later was published in the San Diego
Law Review. See Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 721 (2004) [hereinafter Bartow,
Likelihood].
91
Bartow, Trademark Law, supra note 90, at 2. Professor Bartow explains that:
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consumers, a trademark holder’s burden of convincing the court that another mark is
likely to cause confusion (and is therefore infringing, or dilutive, or possibly both)
empirically seems to be an easier one to meet in many cases.
Id. at 31. See also Bartow, Likelihood, supra note 90, at 779.
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Professor Bartow summarizes:
trademark infringement occurs when one party adopts a trademark that is the same as
or is so similar to an existing mark that, when it is applied to the second user’s goods
or services, the purchasing public is likely to be confused, mistaken, or deceived about
the source goods or services themselves, or about the relationship between the parties
that make the goods or provide the services.
Id. at 16 (citing 15 U.S.C. 1114(1)).
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For example, wealthy people are considered to be less easily confused than poor people when
it comes to their spending. This perception reflects the stereotype that affluent or freespending individuals pay greater attention to their purchases, and are therefore less likely to
be susceptible to trademark confusion.94 While this may be true, I also entertain the contrary
possibility that individuals with limited financial resources would have reason to be even
more conscious of their spending.
Many products, such as health and beauty aids, are extensively marketed to women,
particularly those with children. Trademark holders use the perception of women as rushed
and undiscerning to their advantage in trademark litigation. For example, a mark holder
might argue that a customer, perhaps distracted by a sick, screaming child, quickly scanning
the shelves of a drug store for Tylenol, might not automatically distinguish between Tylenol
and the somewhat similarly packaged medication Tempenol.95 Because courts have shown a
tendency to treat female consumers in a paternalistic manner, the fact that this product would
be directed towards women, and purchased by women, would likely play a role in the court’s
assessment of the likelihood of confusion.96
Interestingly enough, the genesis of this paper was unrelated to gender. It was first
inspired by the curiosity of my students during the first semester I taught Trademark Law.
We used a wonderful case book by Jane Ginsburg and Jessica Litman97 that discusses a case
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See Bartow, Likelihood, supra note 90, at 772.
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that gratuitously made fun of Southerners. Instead of addressing the facts of the case, the
opinion digressed into an insulting analysis of whether or not Southerners are capable of
possessing a discriminating taste for wine, concluding that the court was taking “judicial
notice” of the fact that “it would seem common knowledge that wine was not a widely
appreciated beverage in the South in 1959.”98

My students, recognizing that the judge’s

apparent bias against Southerners affected judicial treatment of the legal issues, asked me
what this Southern stereotype had to do with the case. I replied that it had no relevance at all.
We began bringing in other cases for closer examination, many involving gender bias. We
found a wide range of biases that appeared to be influential in court decisions even though
gender overtly had nothing to do with the case facts. We subsequently examined the effects
of a range of biases on courts’ likelihood of confusion determinations99

I ultimately

compiled this material into an article.100

PROFESSOR HEMINWAY:

Deseriee Kennedy also has examined the relationships

among gender, race, and the consumer marketplace, although from a different vantage point.
Deseriee, could you elaborate on your scholarship in this area?

PROFESSOR KENNEDY: I write about hierarchies of power and privilege and the role of
key organizing institutions in U.S. society. I have particularly focused on the commercial
marketplace because, in addition to its economic importance, it involves an interesting
interchange of cultural influences. While many economic theorists assert a rationality in
98
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business that would discourage discrimination based on gender, race, or ethnicity,101
discrimination continues to be prevalent.102 In my recent work, I have been looking at ways
in which discriminatory behaviors manifest themselves in the marketplace and how effective
law and legal institutions have been in responding to discrimination.103 My work specifically
examines ways in which the law influences advertising and how advertising subsequently
influences culture. For example, an article that I wrote examines whether marketing images
exploit race and gender stereotypes in order to affect the marketplace and influence
culture.104 I have examined this subject from a historical perspective, analyzing the ways that
advertisements were used to sell black people during the antebellum period, and how racist
stereotypes were later used to sell a variety of products and services, including soap and
rice.105 An evaluation of history has revealed many other egregious forms of racial and
gender stereotypes. I found that contemporary use of stereotypical images of people of color
and women is often much more subtle, but no less powerful.106 I also evaluated ways that
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such manipulative images feed into our basic assumptions about how the world works and
how people interact.107
Another paper examines the impact of consumer discrimination, the disparate
treatment and increased surveillance of people of color, in the consumer marketplace.108
This issue has recently received attention in the news due to the alleged discriminatory
practices at Macy’s and Bloomingdale’s department stores.109
Most recently, I have been researching protests in the Niger Delta against
multinational oil companies drilling in the area. A sizable portion of the world’s oil comes
from Africa, and Nigeria produces large quantities of oil. Many multinational oil companies
operate in small rural communities in countries, like the Niger Delta, that have experienced
serious political unrest.110 The local communities subsist under desperately poor conditions
and have few political tools at their disposal. The region has witnessed severe environmental
degradation and human rights violations.111 Women of all ages from the community have
joined together to protest against Chevron/Texaco's conduct in their community. At one
event, in a display of active feminism and environmentalism, the women prevented men from
coming or going to work by threatening to remove their clothes. This was a traditional way
107
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of shaming Nigerian men; a man who saw a woman naked in public would be cursed
forever.112 They were compelled to get involved because the Nigerian police and military
were systematically arresting and killing the men who protested. By using their own bodies,
these women effectively prevented a multinational corporation from operating locally for
about a week.113
Chevron/Texaco eventually negotiated with these women and granted modest, yet
important, concessions, such as jobs for the men in the community, schools, and
opportunities for people to work and to improve their quality of life. I find this story
particularly compelling because these women in this community had so little power and had
so few resources at their disposal to combat this serious situation. However, these women
were afforded a degree of protection based on their womanhood and femininity and were
able to use that advantage to influence the marketplace. This story demonstrates the two-way
interaction of women and people of color in the commercial marketplace.

PROFESSOR HEMINWAY: This research highlights another of your areas of interest.
Could you comment on the intersection of social and economic structural institutions with
feminism, gender, or racism?

PROFESSOR KENNEDY: A key organizing institution is the workplace, and I am
interested in exploring the degree to which feminism, feminist legal theory, and other critical
legal scholarship should focus on women as workers in order to narrow the wage gap, break
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the glass ceiling, and ease the work-family conflict.114 For example, to what extent should
workplace institutions be reorganized to meet the needs of parents and female workers?115
Feminists and workers shouldering the burden of parenthood, or caring for their own parents,
raised awareness of the need for increased flexibility of the workplace for employees with
family responsibilities.116 The most public manifestation of this increased awareness has
been the Family and Medical Leave Act.117 Passed under the Clinton administration, this
law, although not without limitations, provided additional flexibility for workers with family
responsibilities.

PROFESSOR HEMINWAY: Mrs. Graglia’s perspective on the contemporary American
workplace is quite different. I want to ask her to describe her views on what she refers to as
the “feminization” and “domestication” of the workplace.

MRS. GRAGLIA: I want to make the point that feminists often attempt to make their
workplace more like a home, rather than treating it as a professional environment. Far too
many women have been pushed into the workplace and are very unhappy with their
surroundings.

Because they have to leave their families, these women try to recreate

something like a home in their workplaces. This phenomenon is well illustrated in an article
114
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that Jane Tompkins wrote for Change magazine while she was a tenured professor of English
at Duke University.118 She describes her sense of loneliness and alienation in the University
setting:
I've just come back from a walk down the corridors outside my
university office. . . I'm looking for someone to talk to. But, with only
one exception, there are no professors in the offices I’ve just walked by.
The secretary I usually talk to has left for the day . . . . Another is on
leave-of-absence. A third is busy—I can hear her voice in the hall. So I
walk back to my office, deflated. A momentary disappointment but the
roots go deep. For some time now I've been restless and dissatisfied
with my life in the university, hungry for some emotional or spiritual
fulfillment that it doesn't seem to afford. I crave a sense of belonging,
the feeling that I'm part of an enterprise larger than myself, part of a
group that shares some common purpose.119
She then goes on to explain that:
[the workplace] is conceived as the opposite of home and what home is
good for: love, safety, feeling relaxed and at ease. You gird your loins
to go to work, as if you were going to battle. Getting dressed really is
dressing to kill—or to defend yourself. I wanted to be treated like a
guest in someone's house, when in reality, though I didn't know it, I was
joining the army.120
She concludes, “In retrospect, it strikes me that behind my lament for lost companionship lies
a dream of perfect unity—a workplace paradiso, a society of loving friends, caring and being
cared for, that never was on land or sea.”121 This woman has apparently devoted her life to
her career. She may not have had children and is now looking for love in all the wrong
places, distorting the workplace to meet her personal needs. She is suffering, and I feel sorry
for her. Her article was very eloquent and well written, but I think that she should have
118
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recognized the workplace for what it is before she built a life around it. This article
illustrates what I mean by the attempt to “domesticate the workplace.”
Ann Bartow wrote a piece called Still Not Behaving like Gentlemen.122 I got a lot out
of this article, but I have many questions and disagree with her interpretations and
conclusions. In that article, Ann said that in the law firm where she worked the “party
crowd” was largely women.123 She explained that women got together to celebrate birthdays
and anniversaries, exercised together, and hung out together.124 Based on her description of
women workers, I concluded that if I were hiring for a law firm, the last thing I would do
would be to hire a woman. In a workplace, employees are supposed to be working, not
exercising, celebrating birthdays, or hanging out together.125 She also wrote that these
women usually do not become partner.126 Many did not even want to become partner
because of the time it would take away from their families.127 I think that her description
does a disservice to the women who put in the hours and are able and willing to make
partner. Women who want to be in the “party crowd” should look for a different type of job.

PROFESSOR HEMINWAY:

Ann, would you like to comment briefly on those

observations?

PROFESSOR BARTOW:

Yes.

The exercise activities and birthdays celebrations I

described in my article took place on nights and weekends, not during the workday. I
122
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routinely billed between fifty and eighty hours a week, and my evaluations were quite
positive. I am confident that I did a very good job for my clients. In addition, many men at
that firm were not interested in making partner. Partners do make a lot more money, but they
do not necessarily lead enviable lives. Partners at law firms have stunning rates of alcohol
and substance abuse, as well as divorce,128 perhaps because they have to work so many hours
to be successful; however, that is another topic.

PROFESSOR HEMINWAY:

Earlier, we had been talking about structures and

consumerism in the marketplace because of Deseriee’s provocative comments. Ann also
discussed how her article on consumerism developed from classroom discussions. Deseriee,
have you brought any of your scholarship in this area to the classroom, and, if so, how?

PROFESSOR KENNEDY: I have given a lot of thought to this issue. While I am teaching,
I do not directly bring up my personal research. However, I approach issues from a critical
and interdisciplinary perspective, which shows through in my teaching style. I want to
introduce my students to both theory and factual material to which they might not otherwise
be exposed.

I encourage them to think for themselves about how new ideas are

interconnected within a broader framework.129 I believe that Paulo Freire has the right idea
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in Pedagogy of the Oppressed130 when he talks about each of us having to be critically
engaged in our own education.131 Accordingly, I feel a responsibility to ensure that my
students are critically engaged with the material I bring to class.
Engaged and critical analysis is central to a progressive and practical feminism that
acknowledges difference.132 I believe that feminism involves women thinking for themselves
and making their own decisions about how to best order their lives. The stories that Carolyn
tells are compelling and real. However, they are about individuals who are free to write
about their unhappy lives. Because they do not address the lives of women who work not out
of whim but out of economic necessity, lesbians, or women of color, they fail to address
women as a group. Such a narrow perspective cannot encompass or define feminism as a
whole. Moreover, her perspective fails to examine institutional or structural dimensions of
women and work.
Feminist legal theory has had a significant impact on law. Its influence can be
witnessed throughout our legal history; it is everywhere.

MRS. GRAGLIA: They won. They won.

Deseriee A. Kennedy, Witnessing the Process: Reflections on Civil Procedure, Power, Pedagogy, and Praxis,
32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 753, 755 (1999).
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PROFESSOR KENNEDY: I do not think it is a matter of winning or losing. Feminist
theory is about empowering women.

Consider feminism from a historical perspective.

Without the efforts of women, the movement for the abolition of slavery likely would not
have progressed as quickly as it did.133 Women fought very hard for suffrage in the early
20th century; the issue was highly contentious at that time, and frontline feminists faced
serious acrimony and hostility.134 Typically middle class and white, these women marched
in the streets and were dragged to jail, where they were force fed and locked away with
rats.135
Feminist voices have been influential in other social issues as well. Much of the
protective legislation related to employment is a result of the work of gender and race
advocates.136 We would not have the 40-hour work week137 or other labor benefits like
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parental leave138 without feminist efforts to protect women in the workplace. Feminist
thought and action have had long and distinguished histories that reach far beyond the
concerns of some individual women who are unhappy in the workplace. I think that the
plight of these women says more about the workplace than feminism because many men are
also unhappy there.139 One of the first cases under the Family and Medical Leave Act140 was
brought by a man who wanted to fight for the right to take time off to spend with his child.141
His boss informed him that a man could not take child leave unless his wife was dead or
hospitalized. The message was clear: the home is no place for a man. On the contrary, I
think that the home is a perfect place for many men.

PROFESSOR HEMINWAY: I want to move into the area of individual rights and family
law, subjects that are inevitably linked with gender. This discussion actually may consume
the majority of our remaining time. Carolyn, is feminism not about structuring our laws and
society to better ensure that women have the rights and abilities to live their lives as they
choose? Is it not all about having individual choices?

MRS. GRAGLIA: Absolutely not. The last thing that contemporary feminism, which
began in the 1960s, is about is giving choices to all women.142 This new brand of feminism
138
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does not want to give women the choice to be homemakers. It is not appropriate to talk
about the feminists who worked for abolition as feminists in the contemporary context.
These women were social feminists and cultural feminists,143 completely distinct from the
career-oriented feminism that dominates the contemporary women’s movement.144 Social
feminists accomplished a great thing by helping to abolish slavery.145 The women who
fought for the right to vote were feminists of a similar type.146 The great suffragists, like
Elizabeth Cady Stanton, opposed abortion and were saddened by working women;147 they are
markedly distinct from modern feminists.148
143

Cultural feminists embrace the idea of gender difference (although they often disagree on whether the
differences are inherent or learned) and believe that traditional “feminine” values of nurturing and cooperation
are beneficial and necessary to families, government, and society. Jan Jindy Pettman, Gender Issues, in THE
GLOBALIZATION OF WORLD POLITICS 582, 586-87 (John Baylis & Steve Smith eds., 2d ed. 2001).
144
Modern examples of cultural feminism certainly do exist; educational psychologist Carol Gilligan, for
example, examines differences in the ways that males and females approach problem-solving and concludes
that women make moral decisions by different standards than men. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE:
PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT (1982); but see POLLITT, supra note 69, at 49
(critiquing the cultural feminist perspective).
145
See supra note 133.
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At that time, the women’s movement was split by issues of race and slavery, as well as class. However,
some female abolitionists were concurrently drawn to the cause of women’s emancipation. For example, much
to the chagrin of abolitionist men, the Grimke sisters drew relevant parallels between the enslavement of blacks
and the oppression of women and incorporated freedom for all human beings, including women, into their
antislavery rhetoric. HYMOWITZ & WEISSMAN, supra note 12, at 82.
147
It was the social feminists of the New Deal, led by President Franklin Roosevelt’s Secretary of Labor,
Frances Perkins, and Mary Anderson of the Women’s Bureau, who fought so successfully for securing a
“family wage” for male heads of household. Their goal was a family wage adequate enough to spare mothers
from working and children from the day care that social feminists rejected “as a general custom,” believing it to
be acceptable only as a temporary solution in emergencies. GRAGLIA, supra note 3, at 104-05.
148
There has never been a unified feminist perspective at any point, although the conflicts and issues facing
first-wave feminists are remarkably similar to those addressed by more modern feminists, and the antifeminist
presence has been constant. Ann Crittenden, for example, identifies a longstanding and continuing
disagreement faced by feminists from all generations
at the turn of the twentieth century, the women’s movement contained two
contradictory strands: one that denigrated women’s role within the family, and one that
demanded recognition and remuneration for it. The first argued that only one road
could lead to female emancipation, and it pointed straight out of the house toward the
world of paid work. The second sought equality for women within the family as well
and challenged the idea that a wife and mother was inevitably an economic
“dependent” of her husband. For the rest of the twentieth century, the women’s
movement followed the first path, and it led to innumerable great victories. But in
choosing that path, many women’s advocates accepted the continued devaluation of
motherhood, thereby guaranteeing that feminism would not resonate with millions of
wives and mothers.
CRITTENDEN, supra note 63, at 63.
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I am talking about what feminists began saying in the 1960s. You say that feminism
is all about choice. Well, the intellectual touchstone of contemporary feminism is work of
Simone de Beauvoir, who argued that women should not be authorized to stay at home to
raise their children. Feminists do not want to offer women that choice precisely because if
there is such a choice too many women will make that one.149 That tenet underlies the
contemporary feminist efforts to implement no-fault divorce in all 50 states, which makes the
position of the homemaker so economically and socially perilous that some women feel
forced to enter the workplace.150 The connection is undeniable.151
When I testify in support of divorce reform, feminist lawyers come to testify against
it. When I describe the realities of women who are suffering, these lawyers, as well as
academic feminists, say that it is not in a woman’s interest to become financially dependent
on her husband; she should be in the workplace. They say that protecting the position of
housewives is merely a disservice to them because women do not really want—or in
feminists’ view should not want—to be home with their kids all day.152 This is the core of
the feminist message.
Feminists will show their commitment to real choices for women when family law
feminists begin testifying for divorce reform and working to protect women who choose to
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See Dialogue, supra note 43, at 18 (paraphrase of quote from de Beauvoir).
See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
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DANIELLE CRITTENDEN, WHAT OUR MOTHERS DIDN;T TELL US 133 (1997) (discussing the fact that many
mothers feel they must work because of the “greater prospect of divorce”). Many individuals have critically
examined this purported connection. See Kay, supra note 24, at 78; HOOKS, supra note 7, at 49-50 (explaining
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stay home. As of now, feminists are on the other side. Professor Herma Hill Kay staunchly
defends the California no-fault divorce laws. Although she concedes that “many couples still
choose to follow the traditional allocation of family functions by sex,” Professor Kay rejects
their choice because she believes that women should “recognize that their unique role in
reproduction ends with childbirth” and that they should “lead productive, independent lives
outside the family.”153 She argues for retention of no-fault divorce laws because they support
this goal.
In the long run . . . I do not believe that we should encourage future
couples entering marriage to make choices that will be economically
disabling for women, thereby perpetuating their traditional financial
dependence upon men and contributing to their inequality with men at
divorce.154
How can anyone argue that this perspective supports choice? Maybe individual feminists
personally do, but the leaders of the movement clearly do not.

PROFESSOR HEMINWAY: I believe that the other two panelists perceive feminism a bit
differently. Can either of you comment on Carolyn’s perspective on feminism?
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Kay, supra note 24, at 78, 84-85. Professor Kay elaborates her view that all childrearing responsibilities
should be shared equally.
Episodic analysis offers such a strategy by permitting mothers to recognize
that their unique role in reproduction ends with childbirth. It allows fathers
to see themselves as essential to the child’s nurturance and development.
With the help of this insight, men, like women, should be able to draw an
important aspect of their self-esteem and identity from their parental roles.
Women, like men, should be able to lead productive, independent lives
outside the family. Female dependency should no longer be the necessary
result of motherhood.
Id. at 84-85 (footnote omitted).
154
Id. at 80. Professor Kay encourages shared parenting, “emphasizing the bright line that separates the unique
female tasks of pregnancy and childbirth from the common male and female responsibility” of childraising. Id.
at 81. See generally, NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE
SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER 205-09, 216-19 (1978) (arguing that children, particularly boys, would reap important
benefits from a more involved male role model).
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PROFESSOR BARTOW: I want to take a quick poll. How many people in the audience
know women who stay at home with their children for at least a few years? Anyone at all?
How many feminists came and harassed those women to go back to work? I am simply
flabbergasted that anyone would suggest this regularly occurs.
Can anyone name any state legislature that had a feminist majority when these
divorce reforms were being enacted? We live in at least a marginally democratic society; if
the majority of people are interested in divorce reform, for whatever reason, they have every
right to express their opinions and work to change divorce laws. If the majority of people
want them changed, I presume they will be.

MS. HEMINWAY: I know that Deseriee teaches family law and has her own views on nofault divorce. I would be interested in hearing her views on this issue.

MS. KENNEDY: Well, I have a couple of comments. Carolyn very nicely hit upon the
point I want to make when she identified distinctions between schools of feminism like
cultural and social feminism. By acknowledging these distinctions, she helps to define
feminism as a broad and diverse movement that historically has taken on a number of
important fights.155
In the context of divorce, custody, and support, studies do not necessarily show that
no-fault divorce is the cause of the high divorce rate.156 After no-fault divorce became the
law of the land in the United States, we did witness a dramatic increase in the number of
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See supra note 5.
See Ellman, The Misguided Movement to Revive Fault Divorce, supra note 29.
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divorces.157 Those rates, however, have decreased and leveled out in the years since then,
which may indicate that the problem does not necessarily lie with the increased flexibility of
divorce laws; these laws may have simply helped to facilitate the separation of many couples
who should not have gotten married in the first place.158
A primary problem with divorce law involves the way property is held in the United
States, because the economic disparities result in a highly unequal distribution of power.
Divorced women are in dire straits not because they are divorced, but because divorce
plunges them into poverty, a phenomenon that has many cultural causes.159 Women continue
to face inequity in the workplace; we have a system in which women still make 76 cents to
every dollar that men make,160 a reality that reflects the lower wages that women receive as
well as the fact that women often assume more family responsibilities than men and therefore
may work less. 161
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Id.
Id. See also sources cited supra note 29. Paul Amato and Alan Booth explain that a weakening of the
“barriers to divorce” (“more tolerant community attitudes, the introduction of no-fault divorce laws in all fifty
states, and the growing economic independence of women”) has made it easier for individuals “to leave
unhappy marriages.” AMATO & BOOTH, supra note 40, at 11.
159
Ann Crittenden examines the effects of property division, alimony, and child support upon divorced spouses.
CRITTENDEN, supra note 63, at 149-85. Johanna Brenner notes that
[t]he feminization-of-poverty literature often assumes that women of all races and
classes have a common destiny as poor single heads of families following divorce or
widowhood. It is true that generally women’s standard of living declines after divorce,
while their ex-husbands’ standard of living rises. But relative deprivation is not
impoverishment. Some women—for example, those with more affluent ex-husbands,
those employed during marriage, and those with marketable job skills—are less likely
to end up poor or near-poor.
BRENNER, supra note 38, at 106 (footnotes omitted). Professor Herma Hill Kay attributes much of the postdivorce gendered inequality to traditional divisions of labor, see supra notes 153 & 154 and accompanying text,
and accordingly proposes a gender-neutral approach to workplace and household labor as an important part of a
solution to this situation. Kay, supra note 26, at 89-90.
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Institute for Women’s Policy Research, Fact Sheet #C353: The Gender Wage Gap: Progress of the 1980s
Fails to Carry Through (2003), available at http://www.iwpr.org/pdf/C353.pdf.
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RANDY ALBELDA & CHRIS TILLY, GLASS CEILINGS AND BOTTOMLESS PITS: WOMEN’S WORK, WOMEN’S
POVERTY 4-5 (1997); HOCHSCHILD, supra note 114, at 3-4, 8-10 (estimating that married working mothers,
compared to their husbands, spend an average of an extra month of work each year when daily household
responsibilities and child maintenance are taken into account). Ann Crittenden argues that studies estimating
that women earn 70 cents to men’s dollar do not fully demonstrate the extent of the wage gap because they
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Also, to a large extent, much of the work that women do both in the workplace and in
the home is devalued.162 For example, many of us could not afford to hire someone to
perform the services of a homemaker. All of the work that Carolyn is doing at home is
incredibly valuable to our society, but she receives no wages for it.

MRS. GRAGLIA: I would argue that I do get paid; my husband hands over his salary. I
am not complaining about that.

MS. KENNEDY: I know you are not complaining, but the issue is the devaluing of the
work that women do every day—like child care, laundry, and cooking—that is critical to the
operation of our society.163 Reform of our system of child support and alimony appears
much more critical to protecting women and children than divorce reform.164 It is difficult
for an outsider to fully understand the dynamics of a marriage or to accurately determine who
is subjected to family violence and who is not. Individuals should be able to choose for
themselves whether they want to move their separate ways; however, they should not be able
to choose whether to support their children or to equitably share property with their spouse at
the termination of the marriage.165

often only examine the salaries of full-time workers; when she takes into account all male and female workers,
she finds that women only make 59% of men’s earnings. See CRITTENDEN, supra note 63, at 93.
162
See Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 5-6
(1996).
163
“[In 1981] Wwomen composed one-half of the world’s population and performed two-thirds of the world’s
work hours, yet awere everywhere poorer in resources and poorly represented in elite positions of decisionmaking power.” V. SPIKE PETERSON & ANNE SISSON RUNYAN., GLOBAL GENDER ISSUES 5 (2d ed. 1999); see
Silbaugh, supra note 164, at 35-38.
164
See Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theory of Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2227 (1994).
165
See Silbaugh, supra note 161 at 55-59; see also CRITTENDEN, supra note 63, at 157-58 (examining so-called
“equitable” divisions of marital assets in the “best and worst states for divorced mothers”).
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MRS. GRAGLIA: Several things that were just said need to be corrected. So many studies
have shown that no-fault divorce laws did result in “a substantial number of divorces that
would not have occurred otherwise.”166 The states enacted their no-fault divorce laws over a
period of years. Some analyses show that when the later states enacted their laws, it made no
significant difference in the divorce rate.167 In twenty-five of the thirty-two states that
enacted no-fault laws between 1965 and 1974, however, the laws did result in an increase in
the number of divorces. It is likely that the later enactment in the fifteen states after 1974
had little impact on divorce rates in those states because of “the easy availability of no-fault
divorces in neighboring states” and because of “a legal system that had already implemented
no-fault divorce de facto.”168
I want to go back to Ann’s comments for a moment. She says feminists are not
beating homemakers over the head. Such direct harassment is not necessary. All 50 States
enacted no-fault divorce laws, and many working women will admit that they only sought
employment for one reason: divorce insurance. Some of these women who may stay home
for a few years eventually return to work in order to protect themselves. Many of us did not
want to follow that path. We were willing to take over all household responsibilities and
leave economic ambition to our husbands. We wanted no part of the workplace.
After we do that for 25 or 30 years, under no-fault divorce laws, our husbands can go
into court, unilaterally divorce us, and be free from paying us long-term alimony.169 Marital
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Joseph Lee Rodgers et al., Did No-Fault Divorce Legislation Matter? Definitely Yes and Sometimes No, 61 J.
804 (1999); WEITZMAN, supra note 38, at 338.
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See supra note 29.
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See JAMES Q. WILSON, THE MARRIAGE PROBLEM 175-76 (2002); Rodgers et al., supra note 166, at 803-09.
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Katha Pollitt summarizes similar concerns about the state of modern marriage.
A woman marrying today has a dead even chance of finding herself in divorce court,
where, as study after study has documented, the system tends to shortchange wives.
Although both the domestic demands of marriage and its implied promise of lifelong
security encourage a woman to put her career on hold, only 15 percent of divorcing
OF MARRIAGE & FAM. 803,

41

property will be divided, but the husband may be at the peak of his career, earning a sixfigure income while the wife is earning little or nothing,170 left with kids in a tract house, as
Anne Taylor Fleming puts it,171 or left alone if the children have grown up and left home.
We are too old to remarry.172 We have had no experience in the workplace for the past 30
years. It is scarcely conceivable that one group of women would do this to another group of
women, yet that is exactly what happened. Yes, feminists did work in cooperation with male
legislators, and no-fault divorce was enacted in 50 states where the majority of the legislators
were men. It is not surprising that some men are willing to enact laws to absolve themselves
from the responsibility for paying alimony to older wives when they unilaterally divorce
them and acquire younger wives. Some men are dishonorable and do that kind of thing. I do
blame the women who cooperated with them.

PROFESSOR HEMINWAY: Are there any final comments on this issue before we move
on?

PROFESSOR BARTOW: Yes, I would like to personalize this issue. My grandmother
was thirteen years old and her sister was eleven years old when their father died.
Circumstances were dire. Their family lived on a farm in upstate New York and her mother
women are awarded alimony or rehabilitative (interesting word) maintenance. The
average allotment in New York State is $4,000 a year. Nationally, the average courtawarded child-support payment is $34 a week—a ludicrous sum, but only half of exhusbands bother to pay it in full. Perhaps most alarming, although women are
overwhelmingly their children’s primary caregivers, a man who pursues a custody suit
has an even chance of winning. The fact that he works proves he is a stable citizen and
a good father, while a mother is caught in a double bind: If she works, she’s neglectful;
if she doesn’t, she’s a parasite.
POLLITT, supra note 69, at 6-7.
170
See CRITTENDEN, supra note 63, at 131-61.
171
See FLEMING, supra note 48 at 207; see also GRAGLIA, DOMESTIC TRANQUILITY, supra note 3, at 293-97.
172
See Peter Uhlenberg et al., Divorce for Women After Midlife, 45 J. GERONTOLOGY S3, S5 (1990) (“the
probability of remarriage after divorce declines steeply with age and is quite low after age 45.”).
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had absolutely no prospects for supporting the two girls. My great-grandmother had never
been allowed to drive the one family car, so nobody in the family was able to drive; that car
remained in the barn until my grandmother was 16 and could get a license. My grandmother
grew up, educated herself, got married, and had two daughters and two sons; she made
educating the girls the top priority. She told my grandfather, “We are educating the girls. If
we can, we will also educate the boys, but first we need to make sure that no matter what
happens, the girls never wind up in the situation I was in. They need to be able to feed
themselves and to provide for their future children in case their husbands die, or in case they
get divorced.”
My grandmother’s younger sister educated herself and became a teacher. She worked
at a time when she could not earn the same salary as men because the men who wrote the
laws saw no problem with paying women less money for the same degree of work.173 I am
really happy that these circumstances are improving. I am grateful that I have the well
recognized right to own property, to vote, and to live my life as I choose. That is what
feminism has meant for my family.

PROFESSOR HEMINWAY: Each of these topics we are covering could constitute an
entire lecture for each of these three panelists. However, we must now move on.
We have talked about statutory law generally and no-fault divorce law in particular,
but there is another source of law that our discussion should address. I want to present an
interesting and provocative quote to spark commentary on the relationship between judicial
sources of American law and feminism and gender. In 1993, Phyllis Schlafly wrote:
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[Ruth Bader] Ginsburg's writings betray her as a radical, doctrinaire
feminist, far outside the mainstream. She shares the chip-on-theshoulder, radical feminist view that American women have endured
centuries of oppression and mistreatment from men.174
Schlafly also says that “America will be watching to see if and how Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg tries to write her feminist legal and social theories into the United States
Constitution.”175 My question to our panelists is this: how has the Supreme Court, and
specifically Ruth Bader Ginsburg, incorporated a feminist vision into our decisional law in
the past nine years? Let us start with Carolyn.

MRS. GRAGLIA: Justice Ginsburg has been very effective in her efforts to integrate
feminist theory into issues that reach the Supreme Court. One failure was the decision
declaring key parts of the Violence Against Women Act unconstitutional.176 Feminists had
supported the act and, although I would not have voted for it as a legislator, I find it difficult
to distinguish this act from the many congressional enactments which have been upheld as
coming within the scope of congressional Commerce Clause power. In most cases, however,
Justice Ginsburg and feminists espousing modern feminist theory have been highly
successful in getting what they asked for. Before Justice Ginsburg was appointed to the
Supreme Court, she worked for the American Civil Liberties Union Women’s Rights
Project.177 Her goals were to challenge the constitutionality of as many laws based on sexual

174

PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY, Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Feminist Worldview, in FEMINIST FANTASIES 136, 137 (2003).
Phyllis Schlafly, How the Feminists Want to Change Our Laws, 5 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 65, 72 (1994).
176
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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distinctions as possible178 and, through litigation, to demonstrate that the Equal Protection
Clause applied to cases involving sex discrimination.179 Many of the laws making sexual
distinctions that Justice Ginsburg challenged were actually designed to provide important
benefits for and protection of women; advocating gender-neutrality, she brought cases on
behalf of the men who, she argued, were harmed by this preferential treatment of women.180
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Justice Ginsburg explains that the goal of the project was to raise awareness of sex stereotyping, which just
“ends up hurting both sexes.” LYNN GILBERT & GAYLEN MOORE, PARTICULAR PASSIONS: TALKS WITH WOMEN
WHO HAVE SHAPED OUR TIMES 153 (1981). She employed a strategy of incrementalism, where she worked to
“find the right cases, bring them before the most sympathetic tribunals, and help develop Constitutional law in
the gender classification area step by step.” Id. at 153-54; see also Morris, supra note 180, at 10. It is
interesting to note that Justice Ginsburg’s perspectives on law and gender were shaped by her own experiences
with gender discrimination. See Morris, supra note 177, at 19-26. She came to realize the full implication of
these parallels as she was conducting research on gender-discrimination for the ACLU and teaching at Rutgers
Law School. See GILBERT & MOORE, supra, at 153.
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Prior to Justice Ginsburg’s litigation in this area, gender discrimination cases often did not invoke the Equal
Protection Clause. Melanie Morris explains that:
[p]rior to the 1970s, challenges to the constitutionality of gender-based distinctions
typically invoked the Due Process or Privileges or Immunities provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Gender discrimination challenges invoking equal protection
were not unknown during this period. However, there was no systematic effort to
challenge gender distinctions under the equal protection guarantee. Ginsburg diverged
from this pattern, bringing gender discrimination claims under the Equal Protection
Clause as part of a broader, incremental litigation strategy.
Morris, supra note 177, at 25-26. Justice Ginsburg has advocated for an Equal Rights Amendment that would
pave the way for increased judicial gender-neutrality. Id. at 29-30; Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sex Equality and the
Constitution, 52 TUL. L. REV. 451 (1978).
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Because Justice Ginsburg’s vision of equality involved a gender-neutral approach to law and policy, she was
particularly concerned with laws that granted special protection to women. She believed that laws of this kind
were grounded in paternalistic stereotypes of women as weak, vulnerable (and, therefore, in need of special
protection), or even morally superior; she perceived these stereotypes as damaging to both genders. Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Sex and Unequal Protection: Men and Women as Victims, 11 J. OF FAM. L. 347 (1971); Morris, supra
note 177, at 39-40. For example, Justice Ginsburg challenged an Oklahoma law allowing 18-year-old women
to purchase alcohol but not 18-year-old men; the law was based on the stereotype that 18-year-old women were
more responsible with alcohol than men of the same age. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). She also
challenged laws that showed preferences for men. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Phyllis Schlafly perceives Justice Ginsburg’s gender-neutral approach to equality as
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Ginsburg was vehement in her desire to abolish any legal preference or protection that
women might have. She advocated getting rid of laws against statutory rape as
“discriminatory on their face” and the Mann Act because it was “meant to protect
weak women from bad men.” At the same time, she demanded gender-based
preferences for women, even in the military. Such is the feminist notion of equality.
SCHLAFLY, supra note 177, at 139.
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She won many cases, and we now have a great deal of jurisprudence that has institutionalized
the feminist perspective, pushing us farther toward an androgynous society.181
Before Justice Ginsberg was appointed to the Supreme Court,182 Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor wrote the majority opinion in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, which
forced a woman’s nursing school to admit men.183 After Justice Ginsberg was appointed to
the Court, it heard the Virginia Military Institute (“VMI”) case and forced the all-male VMI
to admit women.184 Cases like these undermine traditionalism, which is one of my primary
concerns; they undermine traditionalism because they ignore differences between the sexes
and reject choices based on those differences, thereby disrupting the balance between the
public and private spheres. Men appreciate and function optimally in an all-male military
environment.185 I believe that the decision in the VMI case has fostered the decline of males,
which I perceive as the most serious problem we face today. As we have witnessed an
increase in confidence and power on the part of women, we have seen a corresponding
decrease in confidence and power on the part of men.186 This reality does not hurt those
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women who are competing against men in the workplace, but it will naturally hurt those
women who hope to find a bread-winning husband.
The combined effect of these cases that I have discussed is to push us towards a more
androgynous, gender-neutral society, which has always been the goal of contemporary
feminists.187 We are emasculating men by feminizing them as we have done over many
decades in our increasingly feminized schools.188 I should add that feminists in fact achieved
their greatest victory in the Supreme Court two decades before Justice Ginsberg’s
appointment to the Court. It was crucial to contemporary feminists that abortion be legal and
socially acceptable so that women could lead the kind of lives they chose and be able to
compete equally with men and childless women in the workplace.189 The Supreme Court
denigration of their moral worth has generated among men resentment, irritation,
demoralization, and confusion.
TIGER, supra note 30, at 60.
187
See GRAGLIA, DOMESTIC TRANQUILITY, supra note 3, at 54-61. Individuals who advocate gender-neutrality
generally believe that gender differences are products of social conditioning, rather than biology; accordingly,
they desire to correct the inequality of traditional gender roles by radically transforming the way society is
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domesticity by creating an environment of sexual egalitarianism. The communal lifestyle of the kibbutz
provided community childcare and teaching in order to free women from the burdens of childrearing. Women
and men enjoyed equal access to the public sphere, and individuals of both genders could freely choose their
occupation. However,
by the 1950s men were doing farming, the highest-status occupation in the kibbutz,
and women were acting as nurses and teacher. Laundry and cooking were still done
by women, whose jobs were in the service sector. Whereas their grandmothers sought
to minimize sexual dimorphism, the granddaughters found a new interest in fashion
and jewellery [sic]. Parents, especially mothers, grew increasingly dissatisfied with
the practice of collective sleeping for the children. The emotional centrality of family
increased for women . . . as an important source of fulfillment.
BROWNE, supra note 63, at 40 (discussing: MELFORD E. SPIRO, GENDER AND CULTURE: KIBBUTZ WOMEN
REVISITED (1979) and LIONEL TIGER & JOSEPH SHEPHER, WOMEN IN THE KIBBUTZ (1975)). Professor Browne
explains that while members of the kibbutz continued to value sexual equality, they moved away from policies
of “sexual sameness” that did not appreciate and incorporate the inherent differences between men and women.
KINGSLEY BROWNE, BIOLOGY AT WORK: RETHINKING SEXUAL EQUALITY 107 (2002) [hereinafter BROWNE,
BIOLOGY].
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See CHRISTINA HOFF SOMMERS, THE WAR AGAINST BOYS, 153- 57, 169-78 (2000).
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See FOX-GENOVESE, supra note 22, at 72-73; GRAGLIA, DOMESTIC TRANQUILITY, supra note 3, at 176-78,
186-89; PATRICIA CAYO SEXTON, THE FEMINIZED MALE: CLASSROOMS, WHITE COLLARS, AND THE DECLINE OF
MANLINESS (1969). In Roe v. Wade, Justice Blackmun wrote that “[t]he detriment that the State would impose
upon the pregnant woman by denying this [reproductive] choice altogether is apparent . . . . Maternity, or
additional offspring, may force upon the women a distressful life and future.” Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153
(1973). Evidencing his agreement with feminist goals, Justice Blackmun has asserted that the decisions
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gave feminists what they wanted in 1973 with the decision in Roe v. Wade,190 followed by
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,191 and Stenberg v. Carhart.192
These cases all clearly demonstrate the institutionalization of the feminist perspective.

PROFESSOR HEMINWAY: Comments, Ann? Deseriee?

PROFESSOR BARTOW: I am confused about the link that Carolyn just made. The vast
majority of the judiciary is male, so I do not understand how Justice Ginsberg could have
managed to orchestrate a feminist judicial takeover. I know she is an intelligent, strong
woman with a lot of energy, but I do not perceive her as having sufficient power and
influence to single-handedly transform society. If this is true, I would like her to become my
mentor.

MRS. GRAGLIA: I am saying that the feminist perspective has been institutionalized in
our society through Supreme Court decisions.

Of course Justice Ginsburg did not

accomplish this goal alone. Even Chief Justice Rehnquist, in a recent decision, allowed the
state to be sued in federal court for money damages as an employer under the Family and
Medical Leave Act.193 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion reflected great sympathy for the
feminist position, noting that:
[s]tereotypes about women’s domestic roles are reinforced by parallel stereotypes
presuming a lack of domestic responsibilities for men. Because employers continued
to regard the family as the woman’s domain, they often denied men similar
legalizing abortion “[w]ill stand as landmarks on the road toward the full emancipation of women.” Cynthia
Gorney, Op-Ed, Justice Blackmun, Off the Record, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1999, at 15.
190
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
191
505 U.S. 833 (1992)
192
530 U.S. 914 (2000) (holding the Nebraska law banning “partial birth abortion” unconstitutional).
193
Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
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accommodations or discouraged them from taking leave. These mutually reinforcing
stereotypes created a self-fulfilling cycle of discrimination that forced women to
continue to assume the role of primary family caregiver, and fostered employers’
stereotypical views about women’s commitment to work and their value as
employees.194
The refusal in this case to recognize the state’s sovereign immunity from suits by private
citizens in federal court stands in sharp contrast to the Court’s recent decisions that appeared
to give new vigor to the sovereign immunity defense, in all of which Chief Justice Rehnquist
joined, and some of which he authored.195

I am not claiming that Justice Ginsburg

accomplished everything alone, but she has certainly been a persuasive force on the Supreme
Court.

PROFESSOR HEMINWAY: Deseriee, as a law professor who teaches Family Law, how
do you perceive the relationship between feminism and judicial decisions?

PROFESSOR KENNEDY: First I want to comment on Carolyn’s reference to men and
women as if there is some universality of power among men, which there is not. We are a
class-based society in which privilege and power is dispersed unequally among people; this
disparity can be found along race lines, along immigrant lines, and along ethnicity lines.196

194

Id. at 736.
See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62
(2000); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
196
See DARLENE CLARK HINE & KATHLEEN THOMPSON, A SHINING THREAD OF HOPE: THE HISTORY OF BLACK
WOMEN IN AMERICA 299-300 (1998); see also Harris, supra note 18, at 34-41 (critiquing the assumption that all
individuals of the same race, gender, class, and sexual orientation share the same experiences); Cleaver, supra
note 18, at 53 (encouraging white feminists to examine the interconnections between gender and race
oppression, and “to include gender and race within the same critique instead of polarizing them” because “[i]f
these constructs are extracted separately from the cultural matrix that defines them both, each category loses
layers of its coherence”).
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49

Therefore, it is not fair to say that women are stealing all the existing power from men,
because that is not the reality.
The reality for many families—for immigrant families, for Latino families, and for
black families—is that in order to exist, or even to subsist, women need to work.197 It is not
a matter of women playing at work in to order emasculate men; it is a matter of families
struggling to survive in an economy and a culture that is often very hostile to families and to
poor people.198 Women do not work to steal jobs from men or to escape from their families.
Women work to survive, to contribute to society, and to fulfill their own needs. Work can
also be empowering.199 Women provide much of the care in our society that we could not
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See Laura T. Kessler, The Attachment Gap: Employment Discrimination Law, Women's Cultural Caregiving,
and the Limits of Economic and Liberal Legal Theory, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 371, 383 (2001) (“[T]oday,
most women must work in order to support their families.”); Vicki Schultz, Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV.
1881, 1908 (2000) (“The overwhelming majority of women need—and want—to have jobs and children at the
same time.”); Mylinh Uy, Note and Comment, Tax and Race: The Impact on Asian Americans, 11 ASIAN L.J.
117, 138 (2004) (“more Asian American women than white women must work, because the males in their
family earn such low wages.”). By way of summary, Professor Marleen O’Connor-Felman writes:
[i]n single-parent families, mostly headed by women, the parent must work to support the family. In
addition, even in two-parent families, as job tenure and real wages fell for men, wives and mothers
took jobs to keep family income constant. Specifically, “despite the rapid influx of mothers into the
workforce over the past 20 years, household income for employed families with children has not
changed during that period.” Thus, for many dual-earner families, the mother's income is vital to
support the family.
O’Connor-Felman, supra note 85, at 1290 (footnote omitted).
198
See sources cited supra note 67. In addition, bell hooks argues that:
[w]hite supremacist capitalist patriarchal attempts to dismantle the welfare system in our
society will deprive poor and indigent women of access to even the most basic necessities
of life: shelter and food. Indeed a return to [a] patriarchal male-dominated household
where men are providers is the solution offered women by conservative politicians who
ignore the reality of mass unemployment for both women and men, and the fact that jobs
simply are not there and that many men do not want to provide economically for women
and children even if they have wages.
HOOKS, supra note 7, at 51.
199
See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 197, at 1883-84. Professor Schultz argues that:
a robust conception of equality can be best achieved through paid work, rather than
despite it. Work is a site of deep self-formation that offers rich opportunities for
human flourishing (or devastation). To a large extent, it is through our work—how it
is defined, distributed, characterized, and controlled—that we develop into the “men”
and “women” we see ourselves and others see us as being.
Id. at 1883; HOOKS, supra note 7, at 50 (noting that women, particularly single women, gain benefits—through
“increased self-esteem and positive participation in community”—from their workplaces, particularly as
compared to housewives).
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live without.200 Where would our society be if women decided they did not want to be
teachers, social workers, nurses, or librarians?

Women also work in sweatshops, produce

our clothes, and do much of the work that keeps us together. These women make significant
contributions to the availability of low-cost food for very little pay and, quite often, often
under very poor conditions.
Women have probably served much of the food that we are enjoying at this hotel.
Right now, women are upstairs cleaning the bedrooms that we slept in. They are up there
washing out our tubs and cleaning our toilets. They are not doing it because they love dirty
toilets; they are doing it so that their kids can eat, have clothes, and go to school. I talk to the
women who clean our offices at night; one of these women told me that she has three jobs.
She is not playing around at life; these are serious issues. When we think about feminism
and women’s issues as an academic issue with theoretical disagreements, as if it is merely
something that middle-class white women are playing at, we ignore the reality that for the
majority of women and their families this is a matter of life and death.

Having an

opportunity to work, to have fair opportunities for advancement in the workplace, and to
have some equity and parity of salaries is not an abstract academic issue for these women.

PROFESSOR HEMINWAY: Carolyn, could you conclude this topic?

MRS. GRAGLIA: I am concerned that my remarks have been misunderstood. I have never
said that women should not work. I am not attempting to try and convince anyone that they

200

See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
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should feel the same way about my role as I do.201 I am criticizing the institutionalization of
feminist strategies that hurt men.202 I believe women should compete equally with men for
employment and that they should not ask for special preferences in the workplace.203 There
are currently many preferences for women. For example, consider rulings of our Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (as Kingsley Browne is sitting there, I should mention
that he writes about this topic and has a wonderful book on it.)204 Evidence of a lower
percentage of females in a particular employment area is automatically accepted as proof of
discrimination, when, in fact, there are other, more logical, explanations for existing
disparities between the sexes. As Professor Browne notes, the assumption in these cases is
that “absent explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring
practices will in time result in a work force more or less representative of the . . . composition
of the population in the community from which employees are hired.”205

It is this

phenomenon that I am objecting to, and it is essential to understand that the feminist
perspective that is controlling these decisions operates on the assumption that women should
not be able to choose whether or not they should enter the workforce. As Professor Lionel
Tiger has observed: “[t]he cold stigma of the ‘old maid’ that females have had to endure has
in a curious way returned. But now the stigma flows from a job they don’t have, not a

201

Despite arguments that women are naturally inclined to be nurturing caregivers and maternal figures, clearly
not all women are drawn to a life of motherhood, and many mothers are out-of-sync with this idyllic notion of
maternal harmony and bliss. See POLLITT, supra note 69; ANN OAKLEY, TAKING IT LIKE A WOMAN 66-70
(1984) (discussing the pain of postpartum depression).
202
See, e.g., SOMMERS, supra note 188, 100-37 (examining ways in which the “girl crisis” movement in
education, inspired by CAROL GILLIGAN, supra note 146, is ignoring, and worsening, the plight of boys and
young men); see generally TIGER, supra note 30 .
203
However, feminists often argue that these “special privileges” are, in fact, necessary for true equality because
of woman’s unique capacity to bear children. See supra note 181.
204
BROWNE, BIOLOGY, supra note 187, at 44, 152-56.
205
Id. at 154 (quoting from Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339-40 n.20 (1977)).

Deleted: 189

Deleted: 182
Deleted: 188

52

husband. It appears to have become more controversial, or at least more questionable, to be
unemployed than unmarried.”206
I have no objection to women competing on a level-playing field with men for
employment opportunities.

If women can get their jobs without receiving special

preferences, then they deserve those jobs.

PROFESSOR HEMINWAY: Let us move on to the relationship between procedural
aspects of law and issues of feminism and gender. In our preconference comments, Deseriee
raised the interesting point that in her Civil Procedure class, “discussion will often turn to the
impact gender, race and class have on attaining fair and just outcomes”207 in civil litigation.
Has anyone on the panel had those kinds of concerns raised in their own classrooms, either as
law teachers or as law students?
Ann, can you start by describing your experiences, either as a student or as an
educator?

PROFESSOR BARTOW: This may come as a shock to some of you, but as a law student,
I was somewhat mouthy and I spoke up a lot in my law school classes. As a result, I believe
that I got a better legal education. As an educator, I have wonderful students of both genders
who I love teaching, mentoring, and communicating with. I am troubled when I encounter a
female student who seems very nervous about speaking in the classroom.208 Some females
preface their remarks with self-deprecating comments such as “I may have misunderstood,
206

TIGER, supra note 30, at 4.
Kennedy, supra note 9.
208
See Lisa A. Wilson & David H. Taylor, Surveying Gender Bias at One Midwestern Law School, 9 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 251, 256-58 (2001) (highlighting then existing scholarly literature that notes this and
related phenomena).
207
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but . . .” or “Sorry to bother you with this, but . . .” Sometimes female students talk in quiet,
little mouse voices, as if they were only saying “peep, peep, peep.”209 When I encounter this,
I want to tell them, “Speak up! You know the material, you are smart, I know that you can do
this.” I like to have women participate more, but I do not always do a great job about
keeping them involved in the discussion.

Sometimes in my classroom certain people

dominate,210 and I have to remind myself to be conscious of this reality and work to make
sure that everyone is equally engaged in discussions.

PROFESSOR HEMINWAY: Carolyn, could you describe your law school experience,
specifically on this issue?

MRS. GRAGLIA: We were certainly concerned about fairness, although the whole idea of
a problem with what feminists call “gender issues” never occurred to us. Out of 300 students
at Columbia Law School, I was one of 14 women. We never thought of ourselves as being
any different from the men, and the word “feminism” was rarely mentioned. We certainly
knew that feminists had historically fought for the right to vote,211 but in terms of our
aptitude for legal study, we never saw ourselves as being different in any way because we
209

The phenomena described in these sentences have been noted elsewhere. See Annalise E. Acorn,
Discrimination in Academia and the Cultural Production of Intellectual Cachet, 10 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 359,
369 (2000) (“the de-centered perspective of many women and minorities often results in tentativeness about
one's conclusions and knowledge base rather than bravado.”); Charles B. Craver & David W. Barnes, Gender,
Risk Taking, and Negotiation Performance, 5 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 299, 310 (1999) (“Men usually exert more
control over the subjects being discussed; they employ more direct language, while women tend to exhibit
tentative and deferential speech patterns.”); Leslie G. Espinoza, Multi-Identity: Community and Culture, 2 VA.
J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 23, 35 (1994) (“Women are socialized to not answer questions directly. Thus, women law
students will usually begin their response with a hedge: ‘I think’ or ‘Perhaps’ or ‘One way of looking at it.’”).
210
See Paula Gaber, “Just Trying to Be Human in This Place”: The Legal Education of Twenty Women, 10
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 165, 183 (1998) (“Women in the interviews characterized the classroom experience as
dominated by men, both in the sense that male students participate more and in the sense that the environment
can be overtly masculine.”); Wilson & Taylor, supra note 208, at 265 (“female students surveyed at other law
schools suggested that they lose their voices in the classroom and that male students dominate discussions.”).
211
See supra notes 134 & 135 and accompanying text.
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were women. When I read Lani Guinier’s article212 and Ann Bartow's follow-up,213 I was
just amazed because Ann said that 38% of her class was female, yet she described a law
school experience in which it seems that she felt alienated and that was far less enjoyable
than college. Without the Women’s Law group and three female faculty members, she says,
she’s not sure that she “would have made it through.” She also described two other law
schools where there was no achievement gap between the men and women, and yet the
women still felt that law school was “a hostile educational environment,” and they suffered
higher rates of anxiety and depression than the men.214 Lani Guinier said that these women
whom they interviewed in law school feel as if they are incompetent; they are afraid to talk,
and the hostile environment makes it impossible for them to study properly.215 I experienced
none of this.216 I believe that one major reason for this disparity is that the fourteen women
of my class were self-selected. Society, at that time, was not telling us that we had to have
some career in order to be respected citizens of the community. Today, only a career confers
status; without one, a woman is considered worthless. We did not need a career to have
status. We were going to law school not because society told us that it was the only way we
would achieve status, but because, for whatever reasons, it appealed to us.
212

Guinier, Women’s Experiences, supra note 80.
Bartow, supra note 80.
214
Id. at 810-11, 815, 819.
215
Guinier, Women’s Experiences, supra note 80, at 42-71. Lani Guinier describes the suffering of female
students:
almost all the women we interviewed described their first-year experience as a radical,
painful, or repressive experience . . . Several women reported their voices were
“stolen” from them in the first year. . . . [Some] women reported suffering from
hissing, public humiliation, and gossip, simply for speaking aloud in class. They
expressed profound alienation from the Law School, the educational process, and,
most disturbing, themselves, or who they used to be.
Id. at 42-43 (footnote omitted).
216
Mrs. Graglia explains:
[m]y own experience differs sharply from the tales feminists tell. I was a practicing
lawyer in the 1950s. From the time in junior high school when I decided to become a
lawyer until I ceased working in order to raise a family, I always received unstinting
encouragement and support.
GRAGLIA, DOMESTIC TRANQUILITY, supra note 3, at 19-20.
213

55

I decided to attend law school when I was in the seventh grade. I had always wanted
to be a lawyer. When I sat in class along with almost 300 men, I thought that law school was
the neatest, most interesting place I had ever been. The men in our class were friendly and
respectful, and the faculty (entirely male) was always supportive. I felt that I was where I
belonged and believed myself to be well suited to my choice. It never occurred to me to be
intimidated by the men in my class, or to view myself as somehow incompetent; such a
thought would have been beyond belief. I would not have been in law school in the first
place if I was incompetent. The women in my class did not have these problems, and I
believe that our confidence resulted from our passion for going to law school. I loved it. I
loved the way we learned to analyze cases. I considered it to be the best training I had
received in my life. After graduation, I had the same passion for practicing law, which
continued until I developed an even greater passion for my children. As a result, I gave up
the practice of law in order to pursue a life as a mother and homemaker.217 My experience in
law school was diametrically opposed to what Lani Guinier and Ann Bartow have written
about.

PROFESSOR HEMINWAY: Discussions about women and law school inevitably turn to
the very provocative work that Lani Guinier and Ann Bartow have done in this area. Before
we turn our discussion to this work, are there any questions from the audience?
217

Id.

Id. at 24. Mrs. Graglia writes:
I have been happy in every period of my adult life: attending college and law school,
practicing law, staying at home to raise a family, and creating a new life once my
family responsibilities had largely ended. Yet those many years I spent as a mother at
home from the birth of my first child until the last left for college were the best, the
ones I would be least willing to have forgone. Feminists recount endless tales of
women’s oppression throughout the ages, but one of the greatest injustices to women
is feminists’ own success in convincing society to treat as a sacrifice for what for some
women can be the most rewarding occupation of their lives.
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PROFESSOR GREGORY VINCENT, Louisiana State University:218 I attended a law and
education seminar in which we discussed Becoming Gentlemen,219 and I was amazed at the
hostility of responses to the ideas presented by the authors. Individuals who were students in
the years after 1994, when the book was published, seemed to reject those valid ideas and
observations because they were dissimilar to the students’ own experiences; accordingly,
they could not acknowledge that these problems of gender and education had even existed
ten years before. I had not anticipated this reaction; these individuals did not believe that the
experiences from 1994 were real experiences. How could they feel that way? The fact that
they could not even recognize the validity of the issue really startled me.

PROFESSOR HEMINWAY: I am not sure that everyone in the room is familiar with the
body of work regarding women and the law school experience that you are describing. I
would like Ann Bartow to describe this work, in her own way, so that we can build a
substantive discussion on it.

PROFESSOR BARTOW: During my third year at law school, I took a course with Lani
Guinier that dealt with voting rights. She is a wonderful teacher and an incredibly smart
person. I began to examine dynamics at my law school that were unrelated to the course
work.

The third year is when students begin to seek and accept permanent legal

employment, and I could not help wondering why most of the clerkships and lucrative,
prestigious positions were going to the men in the class. I examined the law-review roster
218
Professor Vincent currently teaches law at the University of Texas at Austin, where he also serves as a vice
provost for institutional equity and diversity.
219
GUINIER , BECOMING GENTLEMEN, supra note 80.
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and found that it was composed primarily of men.220 Most individuals who graduated with
honors were men.221 Participation on moot court teams was based on grades, and since men
generally maintained higher grade point averages, moot court teams were mostly comprised
of men.222
Women comprised thirty-eight percent of the student body; however, they did not
receive anywhere near thirty-eight percent of the grade-based perks and privileges of the law
school.223 The serious disparity that I noticed made me wonder why this phenomenon was
still occurring. There are a number of possible explanations,224 and the article is meant to
encourage further inquiry on the topic.225 I have since learned, from other research, that in
almost every educational context women out-perform men.226 They under-perform men on
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See Guinier, Women’s Experiences, supra note 80, at 28.
Id. at 26-28.
222
Id. at 30-31.
223
Professor Guinier and her coauthors analyze and discuss this phenomenon. See Id. at 21-32. The authors
explain that the credentials of the male and female students are comparable upon admittance to the law school,
but that “women graduate from the Law School with significantly less distinguished professional credentials.”
Id. at 21. By the end of the first year, the men in the class had received “significantly better grades” and “they
maintain[ed] this advantage through graduation.” Id. at 23.
224
Professor Guinier and her coauthors explore three hypothetical explanations for this phenomenon. First,
women could be suffering from alienation within the formal structure of the law school. Id. at 61-71. Women
also could be alienated from informal learning networks, like study groups. Id. at 71-80. Finally, women could
be inherently different from men in ways that make them ill-equipped for the male-dominated, aggressive
environment of law school. Id. at 80-84.
225
The article discusses several future avenues of discussion.
[T]he needs of many female law students present an occasion to reexamine traditional
assumptions about lawyering. This reexamination is timely in light of the changing
character of the legal profession. Such a reassessment presents an opportunity to
reconsider the value of the dominant pedagogy and the accompanying emphasis on
adversarialism that presently permeates legal education.
Id. at 84. More specifically, the authors identify three possible avenues of future inquiry on the subject. First,
the authors suggest an exploration of “conventional assumptions that the large Socratic classroom should
dominate first-year instruction” in the context of “more pluralistic” approaches that might lessen the alienation
of women law school students. Id. at 93-94. Next, they recommend an investigation of the “limitations of the
adversarial model of problem-solving, at least in this model’s role as the universal, exclusive norm for legal
education.” Id. at 95. Third, they encourage development of a program of intervention, to be implemented by
the school, that would help structure the “informal learning networks” to more effectively integrate women into
the law school community. Id. at 97-98.
226
See generally SOMMERS, supra note 188, at 23-45 (examining and discussing the many ways that “today’s
girls outshine boys”).
221
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entrance tests,227 which also raises some interesting and important questions, but as far as
grades go, they out-perform men.228 Law school is the only professional school where this is
not true.229 At that time, I wanted to know why, and I would still like to know why.

PROFESSOR HEMINWAY: This topic is, indeed, very interesting. I want to be clear here
that Carolyn and Ann are both referencing observational studies that are context-based. One
might have a more limited population than another, a reality that we must recognize as they
share their viewpoints.

MRS. GRAGLIA: Your statistics on that really pertain only to elite law schools.230 The
problem for women who compete with men in the elite law schools, which accept only
students with the highest aptitude, is that there are more men at the tails of the bell curve, so
that more men are geniuses and more are morons.231 At an elite law school, a larger body of
men will be at the very top of the class, and that is going to make it harder even for an
average, intelligent, well skilled woman to compete for the very top positions.232 That is
particularly going to be the case as more women are encouraged to attend law school. The
fourteen women at my school were probably all near the top of the class, otherwise we
probably never would have gone to law school; it would not have occurred to us to try. We
227

Id. at 31-32.
See Carol A. Dwyer & Linda M. Johnson, Grades, Accomplishments, and Correlates, in GENDER AND FAIR
ASSESSMENT 127, 127-56 (Warren W. Willingham & Nancy S. Cole eds., 1997).
229
See Sarah Berger et al., Hey! There’s Ladies Here, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1022, 1044 (1998).
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Ann Bartow discusses this limitation:
the absence of a cognizable performance gap may give non-elite law schools reason to
assume that their female students either cannot complain about the law school
environment, or can be ignored or neutralized if they do. Most elite law schools,
however, can’t even pretend not to have a gender-based achievement differential.
Bartow, supra note 80, at 816 (citing and discussing Richard K. Neumann Jr., Women in Legal Education:
What the Statistics Show, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313, 322 (2000)).
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were used to being the top academic performers. Now that there are so many more women
pursuing a legal education in the elite schools, a lot more of them are going to be in the lower
range, as opposed to the almost genius-level men at the top. This achievement gap between
men and women occurs only in the elite law schools. Professor Dan Subotnik’s survey of
students at Touro Law School disclosed no achievement gap and no reactions on the part of
women students like those described by Ann Bartow and Lani Guinier.233 However, Touro
Law School is not one of the elite schools.
It is accepted that the LSAT score is the best predictor of success in law school, not
undergraduate grades.234 In undergraduate schools, students, for the most part, select their
own courses. Undergraduate women may do so well in comparison with their standardized
test scores because they choose the courses and professors that they like. They could be
choosing to take easier courses; then, when they attend an elite law school, it appears that
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See DAN SUBOTNIK, TOXIC DIVERSITY: RACE, GENDER, AND LAW TALK IN AMERICA (forthcoming 2005).
LSAT & LSDAS REGISTRATION & INFORMATION BOOK 121 (2003-2004 ed.); Richard H. Sander, A Systemic
Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV. 367, 420 n.146, 421-424 (examining
the role of race in law school admissions and noting that, although law schools and other institutions could
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overblown”). But see LSAT & LSDAS REGISTRATION & INFORMATION BOOK 92 (2005-2006 ed.) (asserting
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examining the predictive ability of LSAT scores and undergraduate grades at Brigham Young University’s J.
Reuben Clark Law School, Professor Thomas concluded:
1) The predictive power of the LSAT score, undergraduate GPA and a combination
of those two measures in an “index” is about the same, both for first-year and for
overall academic performance.
2) Although the differences may be small or statistically insignificant, the LSAT
score is a better predictor than GPA of first-year law school performance, and
GPA is a better predictor of overall law school performance. An index with a
combination of LSAT score and GPA is substantially better than either LSAT
score or GPA alone in predicting both first-year and overall law school
performance.
3) The predictive power of any of these measures is not strong, and only the most
general patterns may be discerned. Entering law students should not feel that their
future academic success is either unduly limited or assured by the quality of their
academic credentials.
Id.
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they are not doing as well as they should. 235 However, their achievement in law school is
consistent with their LSAT, which is more predictive than those women’s undergraduate
grades.236 It is not a problem; it is merely an observation of what is logically the case.

PROFESSOR HEMINWAY: These are important issues. Women, in fact, now comprise
more than half of the population in many U.S. law schools and other institutions of higher
education than men.237

MRS. GRAGLIA: In this country men and women can achieve educational levels equally.
This reality is great; I am certainly in favor of education, which helps people to enjoy life
more and brings increased opportunities. Kingsley Browne, who is present in the audience,
should introduce himself.238 His books explain why similar education does not result in the
same representation of men and women in power structures: women do not have that
representation because many of them do not choose that path.239 Studies have shown that
women do not choose that path at the same rate as men because women find their greatest
satisfaction in life from their families while men find the greatest satisfaction in life from
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BROWNE, BIOLOGY, supra note 187, at 30 (noting that “[g]irls’ SAT scores slightly underpredict their future
academic performance, but much of that effect disappears when difficulty of college coursework is controlled).
Professor Jeffrey Kinsler has examined this possibility in a study at Marquette University Law School,
however, and found that “no significant correlation between undergraduate majors and law school performance”
exists. Jeffrey S. Kinsler, The LSAT Myth, 20 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 393, 394 (2001).
236
See supra note 234.
237
See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Women's Progress at the Bar and on the Bench, 89 CORNELL L.
REV. 801, 804 (2004) (“Today, women are more than fifty percent of the entering law school population”);
Reynaldo Anaya Valencia & Miguel A. Ortiz, The Persistent Challenge of Gender and Law: Views From One
Law School's Student Body, 3 SCHOLAR 157, 163 (2001) (“in 2001 for the first time in U.S. history, women
comprised over one half of all entering students in the nation's law schools.”).
238
Kingsley Browne, Professor of Law at Wayne State University Law School, has written several books and
articles dealing with gender issues from an evolutionary perspective. See, e.g., BROWNE, supra note 63;
Browne, supra note 185; BROWNE, BIOLOGY, supra note 187.
239
BROWNE, supra note 63, at 42-48.
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their jobs.240 Women do not want to sacrifice that much family time to achieve in the
workplace.

PROFESSOR HEMINWAY: Professor Bartow? Professor Kennedy?

PROFESSOR KENNEDY: I would disagree that the disparity in achievement for men and
women is simply a matter of choice. Framing the issue as one of choice ignores the
structural and cultural limitations on making free choices.241 I think it has a lot more to do
with power and privilege than it does with an individual choice. Women are sometimes
making choices within a vacuum that limits the range of choices and the range of movement
that they can make.242

PROFESSOR BARTOW: I would like briefly to return to a previous point concerning Dan
Subotnik's research. Touro is a wonderful law school, but how many of you folks in the
audience graduated from there? How many Supreme Court law clerks graduated from Touro
Law Center?

These gender dichotomies may be less pervasive at less prestigious law

schools, but you generally have to go to an elite law school if you want to clerk for a federal
judge or become a law professor.243 That is why these issues are important, because women
face increased barriers in these entranceways to potential success and power. If we really
want women to have the choice to achieve, we need to examine these barriers to success to
240

Professor Browne examines the contemporary feminist movement in an evolutionary context. BROWNE,
supra note 187. Professor Browne argues that the male desire for competition and power in the workplace is
part of the evolved male reproductive strategy; males compete among themselves for power and status in order
to attract females, both in nature and in the workplace. Id. Likewise, Professor Browne argues that the
feminine tendency toward cooperation and nurturing is part of the evolved female reproductive strategy. Id.
241
CHAMALLAS, supra note 12, at 11-13.
242
Id.
243
See supra note 230-233 and accompanying text.
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see how much of this phenomenon is driven by personal choices in education and how much
is actually driven by inequality women face.

PROFESSOR HEMINWAY: It seems that you all may be saying the same thing here. We
see different results for different law schools and different time periods; we cannot find full
clarity from these individual studies and must examine them in their broader context.

PROFESSOR STEVEN MULROY, University of Memphis School of Law: Professor
Bartow, as I understand it, women out-perform men in terms of grades and graduate level
performance in areas other than law, and it is only in the field of law that we find the
disparity you describe.244 However, men out-perform women on the standardized exams,
like the GMAT and the LSAT, that are the gateways to law and those other graduate level
studies.245 So, despite Mrs. Graglia’s comments, we still need to account for the unique
aspects of law that create this difference between women’s performance in other areas and
the actual grades of female students once they get to law school, correct?

PROFESSOR BARTOW: That is absolutely right. The LSAT is a really lousy predictor of
a student’s performance in law school.246

Anyone who has served on an admissions

committee recognizes that. It really is hard to judge how students will perform once they get
to law school because they are coming from different colleges and different fields of study.
It is extremely difficult to compare and contrast different schools and different majors, so we
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See supra notes 226-229 and accompanying text.
See Catherine A. Lugg, Attacking Affirmative Action, in MEASURED LIES: THE BELL CURVE EXAMINED 374
(Joe L. Kincheloe et al. eds., 1997). See also infra note 265.
246
See supra note 234.
245
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fall back to LSAT scores as the best predictors we have to work with. However, the best that
the LSAT ever has been asserted to predict is about 16 percent, and usually it is under 10
percent for first-year grades.247 In examining whether the LSAT is capable of predicting who
will be a good lawyer, we first must agree on a definition of what a good lawyer actually is,
which is a rather contentious issue.

PROFESSOR MULROY: Is there some basis for believing that the LSAT is a better
predictor than its analogs in other fields of past-undergraduate study, or is that not, in fact,
the answer? Do we still have a mystery? I have another question as well: why are female
geniuses not self-selecting into the elite law schools? If attention has been drawn to the
distinction between the prestige and opportunities of elite law schools and law schools like
Touro, why are the female geniuses not selecting schools like Harvard at the same rate as
male geniuses? The disparity still does not make sense.

PROFESSOR BARTOW: Many women certainly do very well in law school. Most of the
women in this room who attended law school would fit into that category. But, statistically,
women as a group are not achieving the same levels of success as men. In addition, women
strive to find a balance between success and family life. For example, Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
who I think is fantastic, married and had children while pursuing a successful career. Her
daughter, Jane, coauthored the trademark law textbook that I use and really like.248 She is

See William C. Kidder, The Rise of the Testocracy: An Essay on the LSAT, Conventional Wisdom, and the
Dismantling of Diversity, 9 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 167, 187 (2000) (noting that “the LSAT accounts for only 16%
of the variation in first-year grades among students enrolled in ABA law schools”); Kristan S. Mayer, Flagging
Nonstandard Test Scores in Admissions to Institutions of Higher Education, 50 STAN. L. REV. 469, 480 (1998)
(demonstrating the inadequacy of the predictive ability of the LSAT).
248
See GINSBURG, supra note 97.
247
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also a high achiever and a member of the law faculty at Columbia. We can find many
examples of women who have achieved in the workplace and built highly successful careers.
However, institutional issues still need to be addressed because of these barriers that women,
as a group, continue to face.

PROFESSOR HEMINWAY: There is a sizable body of developing scholarship dealing
with the relationship between the LSAT and classifications such as race and gender, just as
similar scholarship exists dealing with respect to other gateway testing devices.249 If anyone
on the panel is familiar with that body of scholarship, it is worth a brief examination.

PROFESSOR KENNEDY: Professor Bartow really captured the essence of the problems
with the LSAT as a predictor of either lawyerly ability or performance in all three years of
law school; it is even an imperfect predictor of first-year performance. A lot of interesting
work has also been done about the extent to which the LSAT questions themselves are
biased.250

PROFESSOR HEMINWAY: We could obviously have a whole other session on it. Mrs.
Graglia, do you have closing comments on this issue before we take another audience
question?

249

See supra notes 226 & 234.
See, e.g., Leslie G. Espinoza, The LSAT: Narratives and Bias, 1 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 121 (1993). All
testing (including law school admissions and IQ testing), however, may be biased, and test changes have
resulted in different gender-based results. See Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 976 (9th Cir. 1984); Sharif v.
N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, 709 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (prohibiting awarding scholarships based solely on
the SAT because it discriminatorily impacts women). See generally ELAINE MENSH & HARRY MENSH, THE IQ
MYTHOLOGY: CLASS, RACE, GENDER, AND INEQUALITY (1991) (examining the ways that IQ tests and other
standardized tests are biased and manipulated). .
250
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MRS. GRAGLIA: Yes, and I want to emphasize the fact that there are very few female
geniuses; males are the geniuses.251 More important, however, is the fact that you don’t need
to be a genius to do well in the workplace. Women can have confidence and other attributes,
such as the willingness to work very hard, that help them perform better than the male
geniuses. Geniuses can be disorganized, unreliable, and lacking in everyday competence.
However, you would not have enough female geniuses in those elite schools to really
compete with the genius men there. These women can be good people, worthy individuals,
and extremely bright, but not many of them are going to be geniuses.
Steve, you want to know why women have this problem in law school and not in
other graduate programs. I believe that one reason is captured in Lani Guinier’s work when
she says that it is the competitive, aggressive environment that women do not like.252
Women, in general, do not have the aggression level that men have, and law is a very high
aggression-level job. Women who are faced with so many aggressive men must somehow
use their academic capabilities and intelligence to make up for their natural lack of
aggression. However, many women find that the longer they do it, the bigger a drain it is on
them. I had thought that I was happy studying and working in the legal field, but I realized
that I was a lot happier once I stopped.253 So many women in these high aggression-level
jobs are on Prozac, which is called the feminist drug because it makes women better able to
cope with the stress of competing in high aggression-level jobs.254
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BROWNE, BIOLOGY, supra note 187, at 27 (“[T]here are approximately 20 percent more males than females
among those with an IQ over 140.”).
252
GUINIER, BECOMING GENTLEMEN., supra note 80, at 2, 9, 13, 28.
253
GRAGLIA, DOMESTIC TRANQUILITY, supra note 3, at 24.
254
See PETER D. KRAMER, LISTENING TO PROZAC, 270-71 (1993) (noting that Prozac “allows a woman with the
traits we now consider ‘overly feminine’” to achieve “a spunkier persona” by “‘curing’ women of traditional,
passive feminine traits”).
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PROFESSOR HEMINWAY: We are running low on time, so let us move on to the next
question.

PROFESSOR LINDA MALONE, William and Mary School of Law: I just wanted to
mention that there really is a substantial body of feminist literature that is directed towards
divorce reform, specifically to protect homemakers. I wrote an article nearly twenty years
ago, and it is not even my area of expertise.255 Many other women have written extensively
on precisely the inequities that you correctly identified in family law that penalize
homemakers and mothers upon divorce. I think many feminists would share your views that
the situation is problematic and are trying to change it. Also, as an international human
rights lawyer, I have seen that feminism extends far beyond the area of family law. As it has
been suggested, feminist efforts have done tremendous things in terms of stopping sexual
violence, female genital mutilation, sexual trafficking, and other terrible injustices against
women that occur on a global scale.256
I have a quick question for Mrs. Graglia. How do you reconcile your views with the
fact that you took a space in law school and in a law firm from a male breadwinner? I
applaud you for that educational experience and your subsequent litigation experience, but I
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Linda Malone, For Richer or Poorer, ‘till Decree Do Us Part: A Spouse’s Entitlement to Division of Pension
Funds and Professional Degrees as Marital Property, 1985 ARK. L. NOTES 73.
256
Professors V. Spike Peterson and Anne Sisson Runyon explain that:
Throughout history, women have always participated in all types of struggle; however,
they play a particularly central role in nonviolent resistance, which requires mass
mobilization to induce the populace to cease cooperation with, and, thereby,
delegitimize regimes. Both women’s activism in nongovernmental organizations and
their traditional roles in sustaining families and communities uniquely position them to
mobilize people at the grass-roots level and to devise alternative networks for food,
clothing, shelter, and health services. In addition, women have taken great risks to
protest governmental crimes and bear witness to human rights violations. These
actions have not in themselves toppled governments, but they have been significant
factors in bringing about political change.
PETERSON, supra note 163, at 49-50.

67

do not understand how you can reconcile your views, because I assume you knew that when
you had a family you would abandon that career.

MRS. GRAGLIA: During the time I was in the workplace, I assure you that my employers
got their full value for the money that they paid me. I do not believe that women who earned
a job by competing on an equal basis with men should ever turn the job down because they
think there is a less deserving male who could use the job. As long as a woman earns the job
without any preferential treatment, I certainly do not begrudge it to her.

The male

breadwinner is going to have to compete and get another job. As long as I am doing the
work, I see no inconsistency in earning the money for that work.

PROFESSOR MALONE: But from the employer's perspective, every associate is an
investment—hopefully, a long-term investment. So, despite your level of contribution, I still
have difficulty reconciling your perspective, because you knew that you would only be there
for a definite period of time (as opposed to being there long-term).

MRS. GRAGLIA:

I disagree with your characterization of associates as “long-term

investments.” I worked at a law firm where perhaps one out of every eight to 12 associates
ever had a chance of making partner. All of those other associates would eventually have to
leave, so there was not necessarily the long-term relationship that you described. In those
days, law firms got the highest possible value out of their young associates. They worked us
like dogs and were happy when we chose to leave, because they were trying to weed out all
the associates that would never make partner. Actually, I was told that if I stayed, I would
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make partner. (I only tell you this so you know that I had a good career ahead of me.) But
my point is that the firms were happy to have associates leave. It is not true that law firms
were investing a lot in associates. In fact, they paid associates very little compared with what
they charged the client for the associate's work.

PROFESSOR HEMINWAY: We have another question in the back.

PROFESSOR KEVIN OUTTERSON, West Virginia College of Law: Mrs. Graglia, you
have mentioned the bell curve and the lack of female geniuses. Do you think that the
phenomenon you described is true for both women and for racial minorities, and do you think
that the bell curve effect is genetic or social?257

MRS. GRAGLIA: I know nothing about racial divisions, but I do know about men and
women. I think the lack of female geniuses is probably genetic.258 In my case it has
absolutely nothing to do with society holding me back. My life was like Ann described her
grandmother’s. I was raised by a divorced mother, and we often did not know where our
next meal would come from. We had to buy all of our food on credit. When my mother got
paid at the end of the month, we went and paid the bills and then had to start putting
everything on credit again. I learned very young that I had to be a street fighter to survive
and I became a good street fighter. Nobody ever held me back, but I was never a genius. I
am not quite as smart as my husband, but I may be more competent. I may work harder at
things and make up for it.

257
258

See SOMMERS, supra note 188, at 31-33 (discussing the ranges of people taking tests).
But see sources cited supra note 250.
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PROFESSOR OUTTERSON: The panel seems to be divided on whether the phenomenon
has genetic or social roots. If the cause is genetic, there is nothing to be done about it.
However, if the cause is social, then it seems that we have an obligation to try to understand
it and change it. From my understanding of the genomic literature on this issue, it is far from
clear that there is a genetic cause for any sort of racial or gender bell curve distribution.259 If
you make the assumption that the difference lies in genetics, then your positions make some
sense. However, if you look more at the relevant research and literature, the rest of the
panel's approach makes more sense.

PROFESSOR LINO GRAGLIA, University of Texas School of Law: Kingsley Browne
here probably knows more about this subject than anyone.

For liberals, anything that

distinguishes and separates people by any kind of skill or talent has to be denied. The idea
that a bias in the LSAT accounts for different performances among blacks and whites and
men and women is false, as is shown by the latest studies. No one in the Grutter case, in
either of the Michigan cases,260 or the Bakke case261 even claimed that the LSAT was biased,
because that claim was defeated definitively 30 years ago.262 Blacks do not outperform their
259

See generally MEASURED LIES: THE BELL CURVE EXAMINED, supra note 245.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539, U.S. 244 (2003).
261 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
262
Cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 866 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (“The court is unable to find that
anything in the content or design of the LSAT biases the test for or against any racial group. If such a bias
exists, it was not proved at trial.”) rev’d, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gail L. Heriot & Christopher T. Wonnell,
Standardized Tests Under the Magnifying Glass: A Defense of the LSAT Against Recent Charges of Bias, 7
TEX. REV. LAW & POL. 467 (2003). But see Espinoza, supra note 250, at 127-38 (discussing bias against
women and minorities in LSAT questions); William C. Kidder, Portia Denied: Unmasking Gender Bias on the
LSAT and Its Relationship to Racial Diversity in Legal Education, 12 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 36-37 (2000).
On the gender bias question, one scholar remarks:
[t]he day when women will occupy more than one-half of the seats in ABA law schools is
near, and yet, even as that day approaches, for a growing proportion of female applicants the
hope of equal access to the legal profession will prove increasingly elusive. The fruit of
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LSAT scores, they underperform. If LSAT scores were biased, obviously the people it is
biased against would do better than the score indicates, and that is not the case. The LSAT
certainly is not perfect, and it does not guarantee that a well scoring individual will be a great
lawyer. However, it provides the best indication we have as to how an individual is going to
perform in law school.263

PROFESSOR BARTOW: Putting the issue of bias completely aside, the research says
unequivocally that the LSAT is a lousy predictor.264 People routinely get into law schools
from the wait list with lousy LSAT scores and become first in their class, and then people
with wonderful LSAT scores do not put forth the necessary effort and flunk out.265

PROFESSOR GRAGLIA: You know that this reality is irrelevant because, of course, the
test is not perfect. Nevertheless, the correlation is by far greater than any other indicator we
have, including undergraduate grades.266 Eccentricities will be present in any test; that does
not undermine the fact that it is the best we have and that it works pretty well. By and large,
the individuals with the highest LSAT scores will float towards the top and vice versa. That
is all we can hope from a test like that.

increased opportunity is, in this case, bittersweet because as a greater and greater proportion
of women applicants are people of color, a larger and larger share of the female applicant pool
will be denied the chances to become a lawyer because of group differences in LSAT scores.
Id. at 36.
See sources cited supra note 234.
264
See id.
265
See Dorothy Brown, The LSAT Sweepstakes, 2 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 59, 61-62 (1998) (describing a
student who entered law school, from the wait list, with a low LSAT score and subsequently rose to second in
the class, and another student with an LSAT score in the top one percentile who did not enjoy high academic
success in law school). For a summary of literature on the poor correlation between standardized test scores
and academic and future career success, see Richard Delgado, Official Elitism or Institutional Self Interest? 10
Reasons Why UC-Davis Should Abandon the LSAT (and Why Other Good Schools Should Follow Suit), 34 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 593, 599-601 (2001).
266
See supra note 234.
263
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PROFESSOR HEMINWAY: I want to hear Kingsley Browne’s comments on this issue.

PROFESSOR KINGSLEY BROWNE, Wayne State University Law School:267 I want to
make two quick points. On the issue of female geniuses, the literature is relatively clear that
there is a biological basis for that.268 If you look at the distribution of traits, whatever they
are, whether it's IQ or anything else, usually the male distribution and the female distribution
are relatively normally distributed, but the male distribution is usually more variable—that is,
stretched out—which means that there are more men in the very highest level, but there are
also more men in the very lowest level.269 Nobody in this kind of discussion ever shows
concern for all those men at the bottom. The end quality for the men at the bottom is not the
focus, quite obviously for the good reasons that men are often on top. Even if you have equal
male and female means, the male distribution will be stretched out to greater extent; therefore
you get more male geniuses and male retarded individuals.270
My other point concerns the question of why educational statistics and outcomes are
not mirrored in the workplace. One reason is that the educational statistics are very gross.

See supra notes 238 & 240.
See source cited supra note251 and accompanying text.
BROWNE, BIOLOGY, supra note 187, at 27.
270
Commenting on this phenomenon, Dr. Christina Hoff Sommers offers the following, as a summary:
[o]n almost any intelligence or achievement test, male scores are more spread out than
female scores at the extremes of ability and disability: there are more male prodigies at
the high end and more males of marginal ability at the low end. Or, as the political
scientist James Q. Wilson once put it, “There are more male geniuses and more male
idiots.”
SOMMERS, supra note 188, at 32. However, Dr. Sommers does not argue that the greater variation in male test
scores is indicative of a greater variation in male intelligence; instead, she points out that, for example, “more
girls [than boys] from lower-income homes or with parents who never graduated from high school or never
attended college” take the SAT, while, “[o]n the other hand, the exceptional boys who take school seriously
show up in disproportionately high numbers” to take standardized tests. Id. at 32-33 (citing and discussing
Educational Testing Service, College Bound Seniors: 1992 Profile of SAT and Achievement Test Takers, iv
(1992)).
267
268
269
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They mask the fact that while women have gotten more master's degrees in the United States
in every year since 1982, they get their degrees in different subjects than those to which men
are drawn. So why do you not get as many women at the top of the corporate heap?
Because, for example, not nearly as many women get their master's degree in Business
Administration as they do in Education.271 Getting a master's degree in Education is not
going to get anyone a CEO position. Men and women are differentially represented in
almost all academic disciplines; men tend to be more represented in more lucrative
disciplines,272 in large part because that is what they care about. They want to structure their
lives to make the most money, whereas women are more likely to major in French Literature
because that is what interests them.273 A guy probably would not like French Literature
anyway, but even if he did, he is more likely to major in engineering or a similar field
because those pursuits will give him the kinds of rewards that he desires.

PROFESSOR BARTOW: I may have misheard, but your remarks gave me the sense that
you walk into your classroom assuming that the men are smarter than the women. I do feel
sorry for your students if I am correctly interpreting your comments.

PROFESSOR BROWNE: I do not think that anything that I said would imply that.

271

Cf. Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, Multiple Myths and Outcomes of Sex Segregation, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
185, 194 (1998); Mimi Sharamitaro, Comment: The Federal Tax System and Treatment of Scholarships for
Graduate Students: Should Scholarships Be Taxed?, 48 ST. LOUIS L.J. 1501, 1507-08 (2004) (summarizing
National Center for Education Statistics data from 2002 and 2003). Trends in this area are, however, changing.
See William T. Bielby, Social Science Accounts of the Maternal Wall: Applications in Litigation Contexts, 26 T.
JEFFERSON L. REV. 15, 18 (2003).
272
See BROWNE, BIOLOGY, supra note 187 , at 76-78.
273
See Martha S. West, Gender Bias in Academic Robes: The Law's Failure to Protect Women Faculty, 67
TEMP. L. REV. 68, 152 (1994) (“The percentage of United States PhDs earned by women ranges from a high of
70% in art or French literature to a low of 9% in engineering.”).
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MS. JUDY FELIX: My husband is a professor at the University of South Carolina School
of Law, and he is speaking next door. I am the mother of four and grandmother of ten, and
my five female grandchildren will have just as much genius as my male grandchildren. Two
of my children, one male and one female, are lawyers. My son is practicing in a small firm
in Hilton Head, and my daughter left a practice in a large firm in Washington, D.C. to be a
stay-at-home mother of three children. My children had more choices than I had, and my
grandchildren will get more choices than their parents had; but, in order to address an
important aspect of the problem, we have to look outside of the law school. I taught middle
school for twenty years, and I know that part of the problem begins there. I believe deeply in
treating children as if they are able to rise to the maximum of their ability.274 I have taught
classrooms of 40, and I have taught classrooms of 17. I pushed, I shoved, I kicked, but part
of the problem in the classroom is discipline. Discipline of boys and girls at the middle
school age involves dealing with two different species, not just two different sexes.
Educators treat male and female students very differently.275 We must revamp our whole
educational system before our female geniuses will truly be able to rise to the top, because
we are not giving them the attention they need at an early age. They know how to sit still,
274

This approach is arguably supported by the “labeling theory” or the “societal-reaction” approach to
addressing deviance. See generally RICHARD T. SCHAEFER & ROBERT P. LAMM, SOCIOLOGY 198-199, 290-291
(6th ed. 1998). According to this approach, using negative stereotypes to define a child, or treating a child as if
he or she was deviant, can strongly affect the way that child perceives himself or herself; accordingly, placing
deviant stereotypes on a child can become a self-fulfilling prophecy because they incorporate that label into
their own self-image and sense of identity. Id. at 290.
275
There are differing perspectives on the experiences of young boys and girls in school. Carol Gilligan
presents an image of the “silenced” girl whose self-esteem is diminished because of the hostile school
environment. GILLIGAN, supra note 144. Some, however, believe it is male children who have suffered.
How do boys fit into the “tragedy” of America’s “shortchanged” girls? Inevitably,
boys are resented, being seen as both the unfairly privileged gender and as obstacles on
the path to gender justice for girls. There is an understandable dialectic: the more girls
are portrayed as diminished, the more boys are regarded as needing to be taken down a
notch and reduced in importance. This perspective on boys and girls is promoted in
schools of education, and many a teacher now feels that girls need and deserve special
indemnifying consideration.
SOMMERS, supra note 188, at 23-24.
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they know how to do their homework, and they have bought into the educational system in a
way that many thirteen-year-old boys have not.276
If you want to get allies for your cause, go to the fathers of adolescent daughters.
These men want every dream, every choice, and every possibility open for their daughters,
and they are the ones who should be writing the laws that affect women in the workplace and
women in marital situations, because they are the ones who have the most at stake.

PROFESSOR HEMINWAY: Thank you for that closing comment, Judy. I also want to
thank our panelists for a very lively discussion this morning.
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SOMMERS, supra note 188, at 24-31.
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